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A bstract
In this thesis I investigate how the FDI Policy environment affects certain 
aspects of firm behaviour.
First, I introduce the option value of foreign direct investment into a 
framework of Dbdt-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition. Starting from a 
pure trading equilibrium and solving for the optimal foreign investment rule 
gives a scale-up factor, which implies existence of a wedge between mark-up 
revenues and foreign investment costs. Greater volatility and risk aversion 
increase this scale-up over foreign investment costs implying a delay in the 
exercise of FDI option. The model is extended to include a Poisson jum p 
process, which has policy implications for FDI reforms. This model explains 
‘wait and watch’ behaviour of multinational firms better than a pure com­
parative advantage-trade cost framework does.
Second, I develop a model of firm heterogeneity with market power. 
Mark-ups are endogenous and responsive to toughness of market compe­
tition. It brings out potential gains in market power and profits as an addi­
tional reason for undertaking FDI in addition to reasons already enshrined 
in the literature as proximity-concentration trade-off. The model is used to 
analyse the interaction between profit maximizing behaviour of multinational 
firms and the welfare maximizing objective of the central planner. FDI is not 
an unambiguously welfare improving proposition. While multinational firms 
gain profits, host and home country may gain or lose welfare depending on 
how returns from foreign investment are distributed among the residents of 
the home and the host economies.
Third, I analyse the relationship between foreign investment policy and 
manufacturing firms’ performance as estimated by multi-factor productivity 
against the backdrop of Indian liberalisation of the 1990’s. Using a hrm-year 
panel from 1989 to 2004, I obtain consistent estimates of firm’s production 
functions and controlling for industrial delicensing and trade reforms, es­
timate the effect of foreign investment policy on measured productivity of 
manufacturing firms. I find liberalisation of foreign investment regime has 
significantly improved manufacturing firms’ performance in India over this 
period. A particularly interesting feature of India’s foreign investment regime 
has been encouraging adoption of foreign technology by domestic firms, while 
at the same time opening up these industry sectors to foreign direct invest­
ment. These two elements of the foreign investment regime have actually 
been complementary to each other.
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1 In trod u ction
Multinational enterprises are key players in the era of globalisation. Multi­
national activity today accounts for more than a quarter of global output and 
nearly two-thirds of world trade. Since the mid 1980’s, world has seen an 
unprecedented increase in real FDI inflows (15-20 percent per year), which 
has been far greater than the real GDP growth (2.5 percent per year) and 
the real exports growth(5.5 percent per year) over the same period. This 
compares strikingly with the pre-1985 era, when real GDP, exports and FDI 
growths were more or less following closer trends (Navaretti and Venables, 
2004). W ithin industries, multinational firms are larger than their national 
counterparts. In in a recent study of US firms Bernard, Jensen and Schott 
(2005) found evidence of extreme market concentration in favour of the large 
firms (top 1 of firms account for a much as 81 percent of US trade), and that 
this concentration has in fact been increased over time.^
As multinational firms continue to acquire greater economic power, politi­
cal power remains concentrated in the hands of national governments. Policy 
makers around the world continue to have mixed feelings about the multina­
tional firms; from welcoming them as bearers of foreign wealth and technology 
to seeing them as unwelcome threats to national identity. Understanding the 
interaction between the two remains a challenging area of theoretical and 
empirical research. This thesis is an attem pt in that direction.
The second chapter introduces an option value of foreign direct investment 
into a framework of Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition. Starting 
from a pure trading equihbrium and solving for the optimal foreign invest­
ment rule gives a scale-up factor, which implies existence of a wedge between 
mark-up revenues and foreign investment costs. Greater volatility and risk 
aversion increase this scale-up over foreign investment costs, implying a delay 
in the exercise of FDI option. Growing market size facilitates early exercise. 
The model is extended to include a Poisson jum p process, which has policy 
implications for FDI reforms. This model explains ‘wait and watch’ behav­
iour of multinational firms better than a pure comparative advantage-trade 
cost framework does.
^The time line for their study is year 1993 to 2000.
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The third chapter is a model of firm heterogeneity and market power. 
Mark-ups are endogenous and responsive to toughness of market competition. 
It brings out potential gains in market power and profits as an additional 
reason for undertaking FDI in addition to reasons already enshrined in the 
literature as proximity-concentration trade-off. The model is used to analyse 
the interaction between profit maximizing behaviour of multinational firms 
and the welfare maximizing objective of the central planner. FDI is not 
an unambiguously welfare improving proposition. While multinational firms 
gain profits, host and home country may gain or lose welfare depending on 
how returns^ from foreign investment are distributed among the residents of 
the home and the host economies. This model also brings out the importance 
of multilateral investment regime and bilateral investment treaties in refining 
multiple Nash equilibria to ensure the most liberal FDI policy regime is 
implemented worldwide.
The fourth chapter contains an analysis of the relationship between for­
eign investment policy and manufacturing firms’ performance as estimated 
by multi-factor productivity against the backdrop of Indian liberalisation of 
the 1990’s. Using a hrm-year panel from 1989 to 2004, I obtain consistent 
estimates of hrm ’s production functions and controlling for industrial deli­
censing and trade reforms, estimate the effect of foreign investment pohcy, 
as practised in India during the 1990’s, on measured productivity of manu­
facturing hrms. I hnd liberalisation of foreign investment regime has signih- 
cantly improved manufacturing hrms’ performance in the respective sectors. 
A particularly interesting feature of India’s foreign investment regime has 
been encouraging adoption of foreign technology by domestic hrms, while at 
the same time opening up these industry sectors to  foreign direct investment. 
A case study of the motor vehicle industry shows these two elements of the 
foreign investment regime have actually been complementary to each other.
The last chapter concludes by summarizing the key insights of this thesis 
and the contributions it makes to theoretical and empirical research.
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2  M u ltin a tio n a l F irm s, M o n o p o listic  C o m p etitio n  and  
F oreign In vestm en t U n certa in ty
2.1 In trod u ction
More than two-thirds of world trade today is determined by activities 
of multinational enterprises, a phenomenon not well explained by the tradi­
tional trade theory. For many years the economics of relationship between 
trade and investment were studied as complements or substitutes (Mundell, 
1957; Lipsey and Weiss, 1981; Blomstrom et al, 1988). More recent stud­
ies indicate such a generalization is not possible, and that both trade and 
investment flows are determined simultaneously by the location decisions of 
multinational flrms (Markusen, 2002).
‘New trade theory’ has developed general equilibrium models for multi­
national flrms in the presence of imperfect competition (Markusen and Ven­
ables, 1998; Markusen, 2002; Helpman, 1984). While the vertical multina­
tionals are explained by factor proportion analysis, horizontal multinational 
activity is explained by the proximity-concentration trade-off (Brainard, 1993; 
Brainard, 1997). More recently. Export vs FDI cut off has been derived in 
the presence of firm heterogeneity (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004).
Real life behaviour is somewhat more complex than what can be explained 
by a conventional cost-beneflt analysis. While most of the work above is 
based on a standard Marshallian kind of economic analysis, evidence indi­
cates that firm’s investment decisions, and even more so, foreign investment 
decisions are undertaken in the face of uncertainty. Studies indicate tha t if 
we fail to take this into account, then, even for reasonable parameter values, 
we may be up to two times off the mark as compared to  a routine cost-beneflt 
analysis (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
Even when comparative advantage indicates foreign investment should 
flow in or when economic liberalization removes barriers to such investments, 
they do not automatically flow in. There is a considerable wait-and-watch, 
a kind of time lag or inertia followed by herd behaviour when foreign invest­
ments actually start flowing in. This implies existence of a value-for-waiting 
or in other words, some opportunity cost beyond what is accounted for in a 
pure comparative advantage-trade cost framework.
Almost simultaneously as the new trade theory was taking shape, a strand 
of literature was growing out of the core finance theory to model investment 
decisions of individual firms under uncertainty. Starting with the work of
12
McDonald and Siegel (1986) on the value of waiting to invest and Dixit’s 
(1989) work on firm’s investment decisions under uncertainty, a rich litera­
ture has developed on investment under uncertainty a la Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994). Baldwin and Krugman (1989) modelled hysteresis in trade under as­
sumptions of large exchange rate shocks. Dixit (1989) applied it to exchange 
rate pass-through under perfect competition. Rafael and Vettas (2003) mod­
elled Export and FDI for a single seller in the presence of growing demand. 
Their model showed that FDI is the preferred mode of production for proven 
demand, while exports is the preferred mode of production for uncertain 
demand.
I take a step forward from the existing literature and develop a model 
of many sellers (multinational firms) operating under foreign investment un­
certainty within the framework of a Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic compe­
tition. I use option theory to derive an optimal foreign investment rule and 
model policy driven FDI liberalization as a mixed Poisson jump-Brownian 
motion stochastic process. Another useful feature of this model is that while 
investment under uncertainty literature is based on the theory of call options, 
I solve ‘FDI option’ as a put option, thereby also enriching the theory of real 
options.
Section 2  presents the underlying static model. Section 3 introduces 
foreign investment uncertainty and develops its inter-temporal counterpart. 
Section 4 elaborates some comparative experiments. Section 5 extends the 
model by introducing a mixed Poisson jump-Brownian motion stochastic 
process. Section 6  concludes.
2.2 T h e S ta tic  M od el
There are two countries: i and j. There are two goods: Y, a homogeneous 
good, and X, a differentiated good with imperfectly substitutable varieties in 
the Dixit-Stiglitz fashion. Skilled labour (S) is the only factor of production 
and all costs are expressed in units of this factor.
Good Y (the homogeneous good) is produced by a perfectly competitive 
industry using a constant returns to scale technology:
=  - S i y  (1 )Üy
where Oy is the unit labour requirement and Siy is the amount of skilled
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labour used in production of good Y. Its transport is costless and it is treated 
as numeraire (price normalized to one).
Good X, the differentiated good, is produced by a monopolistically com­
petitive industry. Varieties of this good can be produced by national (indexed 
by n) or multi-national (indexed by m) firms. Let stand
for the number of firms of each type operating in equilibrium, headquartered 
respectively in country i and j.
Sector X has a linear cost function with both fixed and variable costs.^ 
Total production costs for a national firm in country j are given by:
%  = + cX^j +  cX^i (2 )
where c are the constant marginal costs, Xjt and are respectively the 
outputs for domestic and foreign markets. Further, are the headquarter 
level fixed costs and are the plant level fixed costs, both of which are at 
least partly irreversible or sunk.
Similarly, total production costs for a multinational firm located in coun­
try j are given by:
STx ^ S ^  = H ^  + G^ + cXj;  -h G f  +  cX ? (3)
where first part on the right hand side are the costs of operation within 
the home country and the second part on right hand side are the costs of 
operating in the foreign country.
Headquarter costs of multi-national operation, are typically different 
from headquarter costs of national operation, i / ” , because of the need for 
greater headquarter services and additional costs of creating trans-national 
networks. Similarly, costs of foreign investment, j, are different from a 
similar initiative by domestic firms, G”, as almost all countries have specific 
FDI regimes, meaning thereby that routes and mechanisms prescribed for for­
eign investment are different from those prescribed for domestic firms. Costs 
of foreign investment are also different between the two countries (G ^ ^  GJ^) 
and depend on their local foreign investment environments.
Assuming diversified production,^ wage (w) is pinned down by the nu­
meraire sector in both the countries:
to =  i  (4)
•^Presence of fixed costs in the cost function implies economies of scale.
assume labour endowment and value of demand parameters is such that both coun­
tries produce both the goods. Symmetric countries always have diversified production.
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Total incomes in both the countries depend on their respective factor 
endowments:
Mi = wSi (5)
Mj = wSj  (6)
On the demand side, there is a representative consumer in each country 
with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, which for countries i and j are:
Ui = X tY l~ ^  (7)
=  (8)
Here, Xic is the CES aggregate of x-varieties in the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz 
fashion given by:
Vi. =  [v r(x s)“ + iv ;(x ;a “ + iv” (x,7)“ +  iv f  (9)
such tha t { 0  < a  <  1 } .
Define e =  as the elasticity of substitution between any two x-varieties.'^ 
Æ, as before, is the number of firms of each type operating in equilibrium. 
This utility function permits two stage budgeting:
In the first stage budgeting, the consumer allocates his total income to 
goods X and Y through the following demand functions:
Yi, = ( l - ! 3 ) M i  (1 0 )
= = ^  (1 1 )
Here, Mix is the amount of country i’s national income spent on good X,
6i is the unit expenditure function for Xic (also called the price index) and
as already mentioned, good Y is used as numeraire (i.e. its price is equal to 
one).
In the second stage budgeting, the consumer solves the sub-utility maxi­
mization problem for individual varieties. Demand for an individual variety 
is then a solution to the sub-utility maximization problem given by:
= vV^T^Mix  (1 2 )
assume symmetry within each category of x-varieties in the CES function above.
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where subscript k stands for an individual variety and the remaining variables 
are as defined above.
In large group monopolistic competition each individual firm takes the 
price index e* and country income Mi as given. The proportional mark-up 
of price over variable costs is given by:
where c is the units of labour used in producing one unit of the good (x- 
variety) and 1/ay is the wage rate. This pricing equation comes from the 
first order condition, called the ‘marginal revenue equals marginal cost con­
dition’. The proportional markup of price over marginal costs is constant 
and independent of market shares. For constant marginal costs and equal 
wages, this implies each x-variety is produced for the same price Px = p in 
equihbrium. However, x-varieties produced by national firms are sold abroad 
for a higher price p r, where r  are the iceberg trade costs.
As in the trade cost literature, r  are the inclusive trade costs. They 
include not only transport costs but all intermediate costs like tariff barri­
ers, non-tariff barriers, border costs, information costs, time costs, currency 
costs etc. According to the literature, trade costs are fairly large, an average 
estimate being 170% of the value of the output (Anderson and Wincoop, 
2004). Currency costs are only a small proportion of it -  about 8-14% out of 
a total 170%, and this includes both transaction and hedging costs. Trading 
horizon is typically short-term (few days to  few weeks) and currency risks 
over short periods are easily hedged in financial markets today, say through 
the spot rate or a short-term forward, which is either costless or has costs 
which are small. I do not assume large exchange rate shocks as in Baldwin 
and Krugman (1989), but medium to long term exchange rate risk, which is 
not easy to hedge against in the forward foreign exchange market, matters 
for foreign direct investment among other sources of aggregate uncertainty 
mentioned in section 3 below. This is because the ability to limit risks posed 
by long term exchange rate shifts is either unavailable or is very expensive 
(Guay and Kothari, 2003). Further, the foreign exchange futures market is 
also illiquid beyond the short-term (Layard et al, 2002). As compared to a 
more straightforward trading decision, FDI typically takes place in the face 
of foreign investment uncertainty. This will be explicitly modelled later.
Production regime for the X-sector is determined by a set of conditions
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called the zero-profit conditions given below:
+  (TVD (14)
< w cx;\-hw c% ;; +  w ( ^ - K T )  (7v?)
These are written as inequalities in the complementary slackness form,
meaning thereby that an equation will hold with equality if the output of
the corresponding firm is positive, otherwise the output of the corresponding 
firm is zero. These conditions relate markup revenues to  investment costs and 
number of firms is the endogenous variable. Depending on whether markup 
revenues cover investment costs or not, firms decide whether to operate as a 
national firm exporting to the foreign market or undertake a foreign direct 
investment abroad i.e. become multinational.
Let us assume for a moment that eaeh type of firm is active in equilibrium. 
Demand functions for varieties produced by each of these firms, as derived 
from the respective sub-utility maximization problems are given below:
XS = X,!" = X ;" = p - ‘er 'M i ,= /Sp-‘er 'M, = 0p-‘er'wSi (15) 
X;j  =  =  Xg" =  =  l3p-^e‘-^Mj  =  Hp-^e^^wSj
XJi = p“V ' - ' e r ‘Mi;, =  /3 p - 'T '- 'e r 'M i= /? p - V '- ‘e‘-'i£;5j
%g =  p - ‘T^-‘e‘-'M j^ = /3p-'r*-'ef‘Mj =  0p-‘T'~‘e‘r^w Sj
Iceberg trade costs imply, if a quantity is shipped by a national (ex­
porting) firm, only arrives in the foreign country and is sold for a price
p r. Mix or Mjx is respectively the amount of national income spent on good
X, which is further substituted out in terms of the demand parameters, the 
wage incomes and factor endowments.
It is possible to further simplify the zero-profit conditions above by us­
ing the pricing equation and Marshallian demand functions for individual 
x-varieties. Some algebra (see appendix A l) yields a simplified set of con­
ditions, which determine the production regime for the X-sector, and these 
equations written compactly for country j firms are:
/3p‘- 'r ‘- ' e r ‘Sj + /3p‘-'e'-*Sj < +  (Ag") (16)
/9p‘- 'e ' - ‘Si +  ;Sp‘- ‘e f 'S ,  <  e ( lî’” +  G") +  cG™ (Ag")
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and similarly, for country i firms are:
+  <  e(j:f" +  G") (A^) (17)
< e{H^ + G^) + e G f  {Np)
As before, all equations will not hold with equality at one time. If one 
of them holds with equality, the corresponding number of firms is positive, 
otherwise the corresponding number of firms is zero.
2 .3  T h e In ter-tem p ora l M od el
For inter-temporal analysis it is necessary to specify the starting and the 
end points. Let us start at time t =  0 with a national production regime, 
where only exporting firms are operating in both the countries and there is 
diversified production. This implies existence of a pure trading equilibrium 
(no FDI) with both intra-industry and inter-industry trade. Let us assume 
the representative consumer lives, and that firms potentially operate, forever. 
National firms in the pure trading equilibrium have an option to undertake 
foreign direct investment and start multinational production abroad. At 
some time t* between t — 0 and t = oo this option could be exercised and 
the production regime would switch from national to multinational, provided 
it is optimal to do so. I will explicitly solve for this optimal foreign investment 
rule.
As compared to a more straight-forward trading (export) decision, FDI is 
typically undertaken in the face of foreign investment uncertainty. This is an 
aggregate uncertainty arising from the foreign environment and could be be­
cause of statutory FDI policies, corporate governance/tax regimes, medium- 
to-long-term exchange rate risks, policy shifts like economic liberalization, 
incentive competition,^ industry or economy-wide macro shocks, political in­
stability etc. This uncertainty cannot be easily hedged and exists even when 
a multinational firm undertakes a foreign direct investment into a seemingly 
similar economy. It is this uncertainty which is of interest here and is rep­
resented by a stochastic shift variable Ri, multiplicative with the costs of 
foreign investment, say for country i:
c r = ( 1 8 )
■'’Incentive competition refers to national governments competing with each other to 
offer investment incentives to multinational firms so as to attract FDI into their respective 
countries.
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Notice the two components of foreign investment -  a certain part {G) 
and an uncertain part (Ri). This being a real model (there is no money 
here), costs of uncertainty associated with ‘trade-in-invisibles’, which are an 
integral part of any foreign direct investment, are included in the process Ri. 
Such ‘trade-in-invisibles’ includes head-quarter services, royalty payments, 
repatriation of profits and cross-border investment flows, which are subject 
not only to the regulatory/capital controls, but also to medium to long term 
exchange rate risks.
In the first instance, I assume this stochastic shift variable follows a geo­
metric Brownian motion, whereby the stochastic process underlying foreign 
investment uncertainty is given by:®
dRi = fiiRidt -f (JiRidWt (19)
Here, is the drift, cr^  is the volatility and dWt is a Gauss-Wiener process 
representing Brownian motion and at any instant satisfying E{dW) = 0 and 
E{dW^) = dt.
An uncertainty which is equally faced by both national and multinational 
firms does not generate an option value between trading and FDI, but foreign 
investment uncertainty which is faced only by multi-national firms, implies 
existence of a real option, say for country j ’s exporting firms to either under­
take a foreign direct investment in country i or to keep exporting as national 
firms as they were doing at time i =  0. I will henceforth call this the ‘FDI 
option’.
To simplify exposition of this model, I will focus on country i and assume 
that country j follows a restrictive FDI regime and does not permit any 
foreign direct investment within its borders. Relaxing this assumption is 
trivial and the same formulation would apply to the other country.
For an individual firm in country j, production decision at any time t*
®This is an important theoretical benchmark. I will later extend the model by intro­
ducing Poisson jumps and formulating a mixed Brownian motion-Poisson jump process, 
which provides a better way of modelling uncertainty related to FDI policy.
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between t  = 0 and  ^=  oo is given by the present value formulation:
OOI (20)
t*
=  J  + G")]dt (with no FDI)
t*
OR
E  J + pp^-‘e‘-^Sj)dt  (with FDI)
V
oo oo
= E [ J  e-'"[e(//™ +  G")]dt +  nGBf, + j
t* t*
where p is the (riskless) discount rate, /3 is the demand parameter, r  are 
the trade costs, e* or; is the aggregate price index, to e^ i^s the expected 
change in price index when FDI is undertaken in country i, S'iorj are the 
factor endowments, e is the elasticity of substitution between any two x- 
varieties and are the headquarter fixed costs. In writing the present
value formulation, I use the stochastic differential equation 19 from above. 
Foreign investment costs are split into two parts - GRq, the setup costs which 
are revealed at time t* (hence E[GRt*] = GRq, no discounting needed) and 
GRi, the subsequent costs over which expectations are formed and need to 
be explicitly solved for.
An individual firm takes prices and incomes as given. It is already op­
erating as a national firm in country j (the first equality above), but forms 
expectations over what would happen if it decided to switch from national 
to  a multinational mode of production (the second equality above). ‘OR’ 
between the two equalities indicates existence of a ‘real option’ between the 
two choices.
The firms know their operating characteristics and market structure well. 
Demand parameters and total factor endowments are given and assumed not 
to change with time. All firms are identical (i.e. homogeneous) and rational. 
Thus, when it becomes optimal for one firm in country j to switch from a 
national to multinational mode of production, it also becomes optimal for 
other national firms in country j to do so. Under assumption of rational
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expectations, this forward looking behaviour implies an individual firm can 
fully anticipate the change in aggregate price index that would be caused 
by this switch in production regime from national to multinational, as the 
producer price of an individual x-variety, p, and the trade costs, r ,  remain 
unchanged. This implies
E{ea}  = ea = +  ATfp*-] (21)
Thus, expectation on left hand side of the second equation is easily taken 
care of, as rational expectation implies expected present discounted value of 
mark-up revenues is same as its present discounted value:
E I  +  Pp'-^e f^S j) .dt
t*
OO
f
=  ^ p ' - ‘e‘; ' S i  + ^ p ' - ‘e‘- ' S j  (2 2 )
The expectation on right hand side of the second equation is more tricky 
as it involves solving the stochastic integral:
E  J  (23)
t*
Using stochastic calculus (for details see Appendix A2), this expectation 
can be simplified because:
(24)
The expected present discounted value of fixed costs for a multinational 
firm potentially operating in country j can therefore be simplified to:
E  / e - ' ’‘[e(iî’" +  G")].dt + eGRo + e I e->“e(GRiJ>‘<-' '^’^^ *.e'’'^').dt
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= -(H'" + Cr) + eGIic + ^ ^  (25)
P  p - P
Present value of markup revenues and fixed costs for a national firm
operating in country j (first part of equation 2 0  above) can be written as:
(26)
f
and
y'e-'"[e(fl'" + G’‘)]dt = -(i/"  + G") (27)
t*
respectively.
Having simplified the integrals, we still need to take into account the 
opportunity cost of real option between exporting and FDI, as indicated by 
the term  ‘OR’ in the decision making problem of an individual firm above. 
While an operating national firm knows the trade costs it saves fairly well 
(from its account books), the potential foreign investment costs are at best 
only an estimate.
Let us call the first state V(ex) and the second state V(fdi), By moving 
from state V(ex) to  V(fdi) the firm not only gains mark-up revenues due to 
the trade costs saved, but also expects to lose the present value of foreign 
investment costs that potentially need to be incurred. The exercise of this 
option can be interpreted as a trade-off between the expected gain and loss 
in the value of the firm in moving from one state (exporting as a national 
firm) to the other (undertaking foreign investment as a multinational firm).
To simplify notation, let T  be the present value of gain in mark-up rev­
enues due to the saving of trade costs when a country j ’s exporting firm
undertakes foreign direct investment into country i and let R  be the present 
value of foreign investment costs that will need to be incurred when this 
happens. Formally:
T = (28)
R = eGRo +  (29)P -  II
22
Let F  ^Rj t]T^  be the value of this option to switch production regime 
from exporting to  FDI. Payoff from exercising this option at any time t is 
given by the function:
g ^R, t ‘T^  =  max[T — R,  0] (30)
Taking an analogy from the finance theory, this is hke an American Put 
Option, a class of options tha t are typically harder to solve and do not have 
closed form solutions. Such option functions are called free boundary prob­
lems and they are essentially variational problems in stochastic mathematics. 
Fortunately, this real option is not exactly like its financial counterparts. I 
will use an original idea from Merton (1973), which states tha t if time to ma­
turity is infinite, the option pricing function becomes time independent and 
a closed form solution exists. Such options are called ‘perpetual puts’ and its 
option pricing function is written as F  (ji ,  t = oo ; or simply, F  ( j î  ; .
There are two equivalent ways of solving this problem - either through 
contingent claim analysis using the arbitrage theory or through stochastic 
dynamic programming. Because of its expositional neatness I will hereby use 
the arbitrage theory.
Using the second order Taylor series and Ito’s lemma gives us the following 
partial differential equation for the option pricing function:
{p -  6)RF'{R)dt  +  ^a^R^F” {R)dt = pRdt  (31)
where p = p — Ô (a la Dixit, Pindyck,1994). 5, which is sometimes called 
the convenience yield, is the difference between the drift term and the riskless 
rate of return.
To solve for the option value, the partial differential equation is combined 
with the following boundary conditions:
1. F  (oo; T) =  0, a ‘terminal’ condition, which means this option is of no 
value, if the foreign investment costs tend to infinity.
2. F  {R*;T) = T  — R*, a ‘value matching’ condition, which describes the 
payoffs when it becomes optimal to undertake FDI abroad.
3. =  — 1 , a ‘smooth-pasting’ or ‘high contact’ boundary condi­
tion, which implies that slope of payoff and option pricing function match at 
the exercise boundary and if not, it would not be optimal to exercise. There 
is thus a continuity or smooth pasting at the optimal exercise boundary.
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The general solution to this differential equation is :
F  {R,oo]T) = aiR-i-a2R~^  (32)
where
y J [ ( p - 6 ) - \ c T ‘^ Ÿ F 2 p a ‘^
7 =  ------------------ ^ -------- — ----------  (33)
is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic equation:
Q = in) ( 7  - 1) + (/? -  <^) ( t)  -  P = 0 (34)
The first boundary condition implies a\ = 0.
The second or value matching condition implies a2 = (T — R*) R*^
Now, from the smooth pasting condition, general solution evaluated at 
the optimal value, R* is :
=  - 1  (35)
Substituting for «2  :
- 7  (T -  R*) RT'^ RT =  - 1  (36)
This can be simplified to:
1 +  >7 ^
T  =  - ^ R *  (37)
7
This gives us the ‘optimal foreign investment rule’, which is a determin­
istic, time-independent solution. As described earlier, T  is the present value 
of gain in mark-up revenues (due to saving of the trade costs ) and R* is the 
present value of foreign investment costs tha t would need to be incurred at 
the optimal exercise boundary for this FDI option.
Intuitively, this rule says, ‘uncertainty combined with irreversibility drives 
a wedge between the present value of gain in mark-up revenues due to the 
trade costs saved and a critical value of the foreign investment costs that need
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to be incurred’. The size of this wedge is equal to The wedge implies 
‘hysteresis’, because by lowering the critical value of foreign investment costs 
it makes exercise of the FDI option less hkely.
If volatility a  — >• 0 (which implies no uncertainty), the positive root 
7  — > GO and the optimal scale-up factor — > 1 , implying there is no 
‘hysteresis’. If on the other hand volatility a  — oo , the positive root 
7  — 0 and the optimal scale-up factor — > oo, implying the FDI 
option would not be exercised, no m atter how small the foreign investment 
costs are or how big the gains from cutting trade costs are.
Thus, parameterized in time, the total effect of foreign investment uncer­
tainty is determined through its effect on present discounted values of trade 
costs saved, the foreign investment costs incurred and through the opportu­
nity cost of real option between exporting and FDI. ‘Perpetual P u t’ makes 
our life simple, because we can solve for the equilibrium recursively at any 
point in time and the optimal foreign investment rule remains unchanged (a 
closed from solution exists).
Equilibrium conditions for country j firms can now be written in the 
complementary slackness form as follows:
+  G") ( Nf )
<-(H”‘ + Gr) + (Ü^)[eGflo + (iVf)
P P  P  7  P P
(38)
Aggregate price index, which is endogenous, may be further substituted 
out using the expressions below:
6 io =  +  A f"(p r) '- '] î^
«il =  [Af"p‘“‘ +  A P"p'-=]*
gj =  [N?(p t Y - ‘ + (39)
We can see that while foreign investment uncertainty is driven by an ex­
ogenous stochastic shift variable, the real option between exporting and FDI 
is an indicator function, meaning thereby that optimal foreign investment 
rule is deterministic, and so are the other endogenous variables, which af­
ter substituting out the price index, essentially mean the number of firms of
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each type operating in equilibrium. This defines the equilibrium production 
regime. If there was no uncertainty, there would be no option value, and 
hence, no scale-up over foreign investment costs, and we would be back to  a 
standard Marshalhan kind of revenue-cost analysis.
It is also pertinent to mention that, what is modelled here is only the 
option decision relating to switching of production regime from trading to 
FDI, after having started at time t = 0 with exporting (national) firms in 
both the countries. This has been called the ‘FDI option’. It ceases to have 
an option value after it is exercised. The reverse is usually not a symmetric 
phenomenon, but rather a pure exit decision for which a separate option 
problem needs to be formulated. Such exit options have been adequately 
modelled in the literature (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
To summarize, we start at time t =  0 with a pure trading equilibrium 
and diversified production. Let us say that foreign investment environment 
in country i is not conducive to start with and trading (exporting) firms from 
country j, which are identical and rational, optimally decide to continue as 
national firms. These firms wait and watch, thereby retaining an option to 
undertake FDI abroad, which is valued in terms of its opportunity cost. Say 
later, because of some FDI reforms, foreign investment environment in coun­
try  i becomes favourable and at some point in time, in accordance with the 
foreign investment rule, it becomes optimal for country j ’s exporting firms to 
exercise this option. Being identical and rational, they all rush to undertake 
FDI in country i. There will be both partial and general equilibrium effects. 
While partial equilibrium effects are reflected in the costs and savings for 
individual firms, general equilibrium effects are reflected in the changes in 
the aggregate price index and the type of firms operating in equilibrium. 
The producer price of an individual x-variety remains unchanged, as also the 
equilibrium wage, which is pinned down by the numeraire sector. The factor 
market undergoes a simultaneous adjustment as part of the skilled labour 
in country j freed up by its national firms starting multinational production 
abroad is used up in headquarter services, while the remaining shifts to the 
numeraire good sector Y whose production expands. Exactly the opposite 
happens in country i, where multinational production by country j firms at­
tracts additional skilled labour to the X sector and the numeraire good sector 
contracts. I maintain the assumption that labour endowment and value of 
demand parameters is such that production remains diversified.
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2 .4  C om p arative E xp erim en ts
We have seen above tha t foreign investment uncertainty drives a wedge be­
tween the trade costs saved and the foreign investment costs incurred, thereby 
delaying FDI into country i, beyond what is predicted by riskless cost-beneht 
analysis. This is ‘hysteresis’.
I will now conduct some thought experiments to answer the questions of 
"when"- that is to analyze the effect of uncertainty on timing of foreign in­
vestment given comparative advantage and trade costs; and of "where", that 
is, in the presence of foreign investment uncertainty, where would it be opti­
mal to undertake FDI amongst alternative locations, given some comparative 
advantage and trade costs?
Effect of Volatility : Let us say the foreign investment environment in 
country i is more risky as compared to the foreign investment environment 
in country j, that is cr* > <jj.
Volatility affects the optimal decision rule through scale-up factor
(40)
By totally differentiating the fundamental quadratic with respect to volatil­
ity parameter a  holding drift constant (a mean preserving spread):
< " )
Now, Q{1) =  —5, i.e. fundamental quadratic valued at 7  =  1 is negative. 
This implies the positive root 7  is greater than one.
Further, Q(0) =  —p, i.e. fundamental quadratic valued at 7  =  0 is 
negative.
This helps us plot the fundamental quadratic, which is itself is a function 
of 7 .
For a = 0.2, p = 0.05 and 6 = 0.03 this plot is as follows:
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f(gamma)
0 .1  - -
gamma
Figure 2.1: Graph for the fundamental quadratic equation (the stochastic
process is geometric Brownian motion with drift).
The partial derivative ^  =  (7 ) (7 — 1)^ is positive, given that cr is a 
positive parameter and 7 , the positive root of the fundamental quadratic, 
is greater than 1. The partial derivative ^  > 0 (is also positive) as the 
fundamental quadratic is increasing at its positive root (see graph above). 
Thus, for the total differentiation equality to hold, ^  < 0, that is, the partial 
derivative of gamma with respect to the volatility parameter is negative. 
Therefore, if a increases, 7  decreases and the optimal scale-up factor 
increases.
In other words, comparing two countries i and p i f a % >  <jj, the cost of 
FDI option is higher in country i and we need either a higher saving of trade 
costs from country j to i, or in the presence of falling foreign investment costs, 
firms in country j need to wait longer for foreign investment costs in country 
i to fall low enough to trigger the FDI option.
We have proved the following:
Proposition 1 : A mean preserving increase (higher volatility) in foreign  
investm ent im ceriainty drives a greater wedge between trade costs that need to 
be saved and foreign investm ent costs that need to be incurred at the optimal 
trigger point betiveen exporting and FDJ.
Effect of drift : The effect of drift is two fold - effect on the expected
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present value and effect on the opportunity cost of real option between ex­
porting and FDI.
Again, by total differentiation,
S S - Ï -
where Ô = p — fi is the difference between the discount factor (riskless 
rate) and the drift of the stochastic process as described above.
The partial derivative ^  =  —7  is negative because 7  is the positive 
root of fundamental quadratic defined above. That partial derivative is 
positive has already been proved above. Hence, for the total differentiation 
equality to hold, the partial derivative must be positive.
Thus, a lower drift (lower p) implies a higher Ô, which from the partial 
derivative above means a higher 7 . This in turn imphes a lower wedge or a 
lower scale-up ( ^ ^ )  between the trade costs saved and the foreign investment 
costs incurred. This is the opportunity cost or implicit insurance premium 
of holding the ‘FDI option’.
Further, a lower p  also implies a lower and hence lower expected
present value of foreign investment costs given that both p and p are positive 
fractions less than one (they are percentages) and that p > p  given the 
assumption of a convergent solution.
We have thus established the second proposition:
Proposition 2 : A lower drift of foreign investment uncertainty has two 
fold effect on the FDI decision of exporting firms. It has a direct effect through 
a decrease in the expected present value of foreign investment costs incurred 
and an indirect effect through a decrease in the size of wedge or optimal scale- 
up between the trade costs saved and the foreign investment costs incurred. 
Put together, they imply an increase in chances of early exercise of the FDI 
option.
Effect of Risk aversion: Till now the FDI-option was analyzed assuming 
firms are risk-neutral, a procedure called risk-neutral valuation. Suppose 
now that firms (investors and/or managers) are risk averse. While earlier, 
volatility affected the optimal decision of risk-neutral firms directly, it now 
has an additional effect through the ‘drift’ term.
The simplest way to allow risk-aversion is to replace riskless discount 
rate (p) with an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate (p) from the capital 
asset pricing model (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Risk-aversion essentially
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means allowing for returns to adjust as a  changes. Each unit increase in a 
now requires an increase in risk-adjusted discount rate by a coefficient term 
containing the correlation coefficient and the market price of risk as given by 
the equation below (for details see Appendix A3):
S = p -  fi = p-\- M (43)
Here, 0 is the market price of risk, is the correlation coefficient be­
tween the value of FDI option and the whole market portfolio, while /i, p 
and cr are the parameters as defined above. The meaning of the term 5 now 
becomes clearer. It is the opportunity cost of delaying foreign investment 
and keeping the option to undertake FDI alive.
While volatility of the foreign investment costs mattered even for risk- 
neutral firms (Proposition 1 above), in the presence of risk-aversion it matters 
even more. For a ‘put option’ (unlike a call) the correlation coefficient is 
negative, as the positive deviations of uncertainty decrease (and not increase) 
the payoffs from exercising this option. Thus, a higher volatility, cr, implies 
a lower which in accordance with the result above, further increases the 
wedge or optimal scale-up of trade costs over the foreign investment 
costs. We have thus established the third proposition:
Proposition 3 : I f  firms are risk-averse, as compared to when they are 
risk-neutral, they will need either lower foreign investment costs or greater 
saving of trade costs before they can undertake FDI abroad. In the presence of 
falling foreign investment costs, this implies a greater wait and watch before 
the FDI option is exercised.
Country Size and Income:
Since income is endogenous in general equilibrium, the variable of interest 
here is the total factor endowment Si. Let us say, skilled factor endowment 
of country i is growing with time at a defined rate 77:
=  ^ 4 )
Equilibrium conditions for country j firms, in complementary slackness 
form, can now be written as follows:
<  -{H "  +  G) (N ")
p — T] ° p p ■’
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p - T ]   ^ p  p  7  p - p
(45)
This raises the strike price, and hence, payoffs from exercising the FDI 
option:
T  = (46)
Such a country then naturally becomes a more attractive destination for 
FDI. We have established the following:
Proposition 4 : Country with a larger market size/greater endowment of 
skilled factors is more likely to attract foreign direct investment given a level 
of the trade costs saved and the foreign investment costs incurred. This is 
because it raises the strike price and hence, payoffs from exercising the FDI 
option.
Compare this result with the conventional model, where positive effects 
of market size on foreign direct investment come through the scale economies 
(Markusen and Venables, 1998), Here, we not only have the usual scale effects 
due to increasing returns at the firm level, but also an additional effect due 
to increase in strike price and hence payoffs from exercising the FDI option.
I have focussed on the foreign investment uncertainty here for the simple 
reason that it is relevant to the facts-in-issue and is closely related to FDI 
policy in the real world. For simplicity, I have assumed there are no demand 
or productivity shocks. I will now proceed to extend the model by intro­
ducing Poisson jumps in the stochastic process, which offer a better way of 
modelling uncertainty related to policy and the impact of FDI reforms, as 
foreign investment liberalisation is popularly known in emerging economies 
today.
2.5 P o isson  Jum p P ro cess
Geometric Brownian motion (with drift) is an important theoretical bench­
mark, but for more comprehensive analysis I will extend this model by for­
mulating a mixed Brownian motion-Poisson jump process. Foreign invest­
ment uncertainty arises from a variety of sources, including but not lim­
ited to private sector expectations of public policy, sudden policy shifts like 
economic liberalisation/FDI reforms, changes in corporate tax/governance
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regimes; exchange rate costs related to repatriation of profits, royalty pay­
ments, headquarter services or cross-border investment flows; industry or 
economy wide macro-shocks, political instability etc. Among alternative sto­
chastic processes mixed Brownian motion-Poisson jump process is the closest 
one can get to such policy related uncertainties.
Let us allow for the possibility of a downward jump 0 tha t can suddenly 
bring down the foreign investment costs in country i. Let A be the probability 
tha t such a downward jump can arrive in any time-period. If it arrives, the 
foreign investment costs would fall irreversibly to 1 — 0  times the original 
value. The stochastic shift process driving the foreign investment costs will 
now be represented by a mixed Brownian motion-Poisson jump process given 
below:
dRi — fx^Ridt (JiRidWt — Ridq, (47)
where dq = (f) with probability A
dg =  0  with probability 1 — Ain any time-period dt
and other terms are as described before.
The expected percentage change in foreign investment costs in country i 
is now given by :
E[dGRi] = {fii -  \(i))GRi.dt (48)
and expected variance of this change is :
Var[dGRi] =  o'^{G Rifdt + X(t?(GRi?dt (49)
As before we need to solve for the optimal foreign investment rule for an
individual firm in two steps. First, find the expected present value of foreign 
investment costs and Second, find the scale-up factor that implies implicit 
insurance premium of holding the FDI option.
First, the expected present value of fixed costs for a firm holding this FDI
option is given by (for details see Appendix A4):
- ( / / “  +  G) +  eGi?o+ (50)p p — p  A0
Intuitively it says, a higher probability of FDI reforms (higher A) or a
higher impact of FDI reforms (higher 0 implying a greater percentage fall
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in foreign investment costs) decrease the present value of foreign investment 
costs making foreign direct investment more likely.
Secondly, we need to solve for the opportunity cost of holding this FDI 
option.
The partial differential equation can now be written as:
(p -  5)RF (R)dt + (R)dt -  X[F(R) -  F(R{1 -  <t>))]dt = pRdt (51)
The boundary conditions remain the same:
l .F ( o o ;T ) = 0  (52)
2. F { R * ; T ) = T - R *  (53)
The general solution is again of the form
F  (B, oo]T) = aiR + (55)
As before, the first boundary condition implies
oi =  0 (56)
The second or the value matching condition implies
a2 = {T -R * )R * '^  (57)
7  is now the positive solution (negative solution is ruled out by the bound­
ary conditions) to the following characteristic non-linear equation:
i ( j 2 ( 7  -  1 ) -k (p -  6) (7 ) -f A(1  -  0)^ -  (p +  A) -  0 (58)
This equation does not have an analytic solution and so it needs to be 
solved numerically. For cr =  0.2, p =  0.05, 5 =  0.03, A =  0.05 and 0 — 0.2, the 
graph of this equation is drawn in Figure 2.2 (on page 44 in the appendix). 
7  =  1.8267 is its positive solution.
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This is the only part of this model tha t needs to be solved numerically. 
The remaining derivation required in obtaining the optimal foreign invest­
ment rule can be done analytically.
Smooth pasting implies
» y w 2 . m
Substituting for ug gives:
- 7  {T -  R*) R*^R* =  - 1  (60)
Solving for the optimal scale-up factor again gives:
1 4* T ^T  = - ^ R *  (61)
7
As we can see, the optimal foreign investment rule or the scale-up over 
foreign investment costs remains the same. As before, it is a deterministic, 
time independent solution. However, 7  now has different values obtained as 
a numerical solution to the characteristic non-linear equation 58 above.
As before, equilibrium conditions for country j ’s firms can be written in 
the complementary slackness form as follows:
+  G) (JVj*)
< £ ( g ’" + G )+ (l± 2 )[e G flo +  (Aff)p p p 7 p — p-\- X(p ^
(62)
I will again perform some comparative experiments. The difference is 
tha t now I will solve numerically for 7  each time an exogenous parameter 
changes.
Effect of Volatility: As volatility of foreign investment uncertainty in­
creases, the value of 7  decreases. This solution for various values of a is 
given in Table 2.1 below:
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cr P Ô A 0 7
0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 3.3263
0 .1 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 2.5772
0.15 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 2.1146
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 1.8267
0.25 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 1.6367
0.30 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 1.5046
0.35 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 1.4091
0.40 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 1.3378
This result is the same as in Proposition 1 above. Higher volatility im­
plies a lower 7  and therefore a higher wedge or higher scale-up over foreign 
investment costs i.e. to undertake FDI the firms need either a higher saving 
of transport costs or in the presence of falling foreign costs, they wait longer 
before the FDI option can be exercised.
Effect of Drift: An increase in 6, which implies a lower drift, leads to an 
increase in the value of 7  as shown in Table 2.2 below:
a P 6 A 0 7
0 .2 0 0.05 0 .0 1 0.05 0 .2 1.3432
0 .2 0 0.05 0 .0 2 0.05 0 .2 1.5666
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 1.8267
0 .2 0 0.05 0.04 0.05 0 .2 2.1223
This decreases the optimal scale-up over the foreign investment costs. 
Besides, it also implies a lower expected present value of foreign investment 
costs (equation 50 above). Both these effects together imply the result in 
Proposition 2 above, meaning thereby that falling foreign investment costs 
increase the chances of an early exercise of the FDI option.
Probability of FDI reforms: A higher probability of FDI reforms, as mea­
sured by the factor A, increases the value of 7  as shown in Table 2.3 below:
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a P d A 0 7
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0 .0 0 0 .2 1.5811
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 1.8267
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0 .1 0 0 .2 2.0887
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.15 0 .2 2.3602
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0 .2 0 0 .2 2.6356
This decreases the optimal scale-up over the foreign investment costs. 
Further, it decreases the expected present value of foreign investment costs 
(equation 50 above). The combined effect is summarized in Proposition 5 
below:
Proposition 5: An increase in the probability of a sudden drop in foreign 
investment costs decreases the optimal scale-up over foreign investment costs 
and also decreases the expected present value o f foreign investment costs. 
This dual effect facilitates foreign direct investment by increasing chances of 
an early exercise o f the FDI option.
Impact of FDI reforms: A larger impact of FDI reforms as measured by 
the percentage parameter (j) also increases the value of parameter 7  as shown 
in Table 2.4 below:
0 P (5 A 0 7
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .0 0 1.5811
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .1 0 1.7063
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 .2 0 1.8267
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.30 1.9356
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.40 2.0280
0 .2 0 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.50 2.1018
This decreases the optimal scale-up over foreign investment costs. 
Further, it decreases the expected present value of foreign investment costs 
(equation 50 above). The combined effect on foreign direct investment is 
summarized in Proposition 6  below.
Proposition 6 : An increase in size of the percentage doumward jump in 
foreign investment costs decreases the optimal scale-up over foreign invest­
ment costs and also decreases the expected present value of foreign invest­
ment costs. This dual effect facilitates foreign direct investment by increasing 
chances of an early exercise of the FDI option.
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2.6  Sum m ary
Real life behaviour of multinational firms is somewhat more complex 
than what can be explained by conventional comparative advantage-trade 
cost analysis. Almost all countries, including the developed ones, have spe­
cific FDI regimes which are driven by policy changes. Even when FDI reforms 
bring down foreign investment costs, multinational firms do not immediately 
rush in. There is a considerable ‘wait and watch’, a kind of time lag or inertia 
before investments actually start flowing in. This is more commonly seen in 
developing economies, where foreign investment uncertainty is expected to 
be high. This model shows that, by indulging in such cautious behaviour, 
multinational firms are actually seeking additional compensation for some 
real costs over and above what can be accounted for in a conventional cost- 
beneht analysis. Although, for rigorous exposition, this model is solved in 
a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, the idea behind this model is more general. For 
example, it could be applied to a sub-national context, where States Gov­
ernments compete for inward investment within a framework of competitive 
federalism.
In this chapter, I hrst solve for the optimal foreign investment rule, which 
is a deterministic, time-independent solution. Foreign investment costs are 
scaled up by a factor, which depends on the parameters of foreign investment 
uncertainty. This implies ‘hysteresis’, because in the presence of falling for­
eign investment costs, multinational hrms will wait longer than they would 
have in the absence of such uncertainty. Similarly, given comparative advan­
tage and trade costs between alternative locations, hrms prefer the ones with 
less uncertain foreign investment environments.
Greater volatility and risk aversion delay the exercise of FDI option, while 
growing market size (national income) facilitates its early exercise. A partic­
ularly interesting aspect of this paper is the mixed Poisson jump-Brownian 
motion process, which explicitly models policy driven FDI reforms. It shows 
how a sudden drop in foreign investment costs brought about by a policy 
shift, as also a greater probability of it, can facilitate early exercise of the 
FDI option.
To summarize, this paper enriches the existing general equilibrium models 
of multinational hrms by providing a better explanation for their observed 
behaviour in uncertain foreign environments. It embeds the theory of real 
options into a framework of Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition. It 
explicitly solves for the policy driven FDI liberalization as a mixed Poisson
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jump-Brownian motion stochastic process. And further, while the investment 
under uncertainty literature is based on the theory of call options, I solve the 
‘FDI option’ as a put option, thereby enriching the theory of real options.
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2.7  A p p en d ix  A
2.7.1 A l  : Solving the Static M odel
1) Zero profit condition for national firms in country j:
Bring the quantities produced of each variety to the left hand side:
ON?)
Substitute using the mark-up or pricing equations :
< w{H'' + G) (NJ)
Substitute using the marshallian demand functions:
Pp^~^ey^wSj + < we(H'^ -f- G) {Nj)
Cancelling out wages from both sides gives the required equation :
+ /Jp '-'T’- 'e J -’Sj <  e(iî" +  G) (N")
2) Zero profit condition for multinational firms in country j: 
pA g -k pA ? < w cA g -k wcX;? +  +  G) +  inCr (AJ")
Bring the quantities produced of each variety to the left hand side:
(p -  inc) j g  -I- (p -  inc) X ;? <  "  -k G) -k n ;G r
Substitute using the pricing or mark-up equations:
+ ^ X ?  < w(H’" +  G) + wG™ (X f)
Substitute using the marshallian demand functions:
0p^-‘e‘-^wSj + +  G) +  weGf  (X f)
Cancelling out wages from both sides gives us the required equation :
+  0p '-% -^Si < e(H" + G) + eG™ (Xj")
The same can now be repeated for national and multinational firms in 
country i to get the results stated in equation 17.
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2.7.2 A2 : Solving th e Stochastic Integral
To solve for the expected present value of multinational operation, we need 
to solve the following stochastic integral:
t*
A crucial part of this expression is the expectation of the Wiener process
I undertake a change of variable by defining Zt =
By Ito’s lemma
dZt = ae”'^‘dWt + ^<T^ e'’"'‘dt
t t
Zt = Zq a  J  +  J  2 ^
Writing it in the integral form :
-cr'^e^^^ds 
2
0 0
Taking expectation of both the sides and using the fact that E  [Zq] = 1
t
(because by definition Wq = 0); and that E[ e^^-^dWs] == 0 (increments
b
of Wiener process are independent of the observed past), this expectation 
simplifies to :
t
E[Zt] = l +  l^a^E [e^'* '’]ds 
b
I now define another change of variable E  [Zf] = Xt.
The expression is now equivalent to an ordinary differential equation 
^  — ^a^Xgds with initial condition Xq =  1 .
And its solution is Xt = E  [Zt] =
Substituting the changed variables back into the stochastic integral , the 
terms cancel out and the stochastic expectation simplifies to:
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2.7.3 A3 : Effect o f R isk A version
The simplest way to  allow for risk-aversion is to replace riskless discount rate 
(p) with an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate (p) from the capital asset 
pricing model. If the firms undertaking FDI are risk-averse, then from the 
CAPM formula, the risk-adjusted rate of return for holding the FDI option 
would be:
where is the rate of return on the whole market portfolio, p is the
risk-neutral rate and F  is the option value function. The covariance-variance 
term is the correlation coefficient between the value of option and the whole 
market portfolio (also called the systematic risk or market beta). I will denote 
this by The sign of covariance (correlation coefficient) could be positive
or negative.
Multiplying and dividing the second term on right hand side by the 
volatility parameter a  gives:
75 =  „ I  j p m )  -  p]  ( ¥ >  ^ m )
a V a r { p J
Since, is, by definition, the market price of risk (let us call it <^ ),
the above equation becomes:
p  =  p F
Since, parameter 8 has already been defined as the difference between the 
drift and the discount rate
5  =  p  — p  =  p  <p7]f^a  — p
This gives us equation 43, which forms the basis for Proposition 3 above.
2.7.4 A 4 : Present Value o f Fixed C osts for the Poisson Jum p  
Process
The stochastic shift process with Poisson jumps is given by 
dRi =  PiRidt -|- (JiRidWt — Ridcj
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This implies dR* could take the following dififerent values, which along 
with their respective probabilities, are :
dRi = +  a R iV ^  with probability ^{1  — X)dt
fii — aR i^/di with probability ^ (1 — A) dt 
jii — (})Ri with probabihty Xdt
The Poisson jum p is assumed to be much bigger than a single increment 
in the Wiener process.
We know from the properties of Brownian motion that E  [dWt] = 0 i.e. 
expected change in Wiener process for any time period dt is zero.
Expected change in foreign fixed costs over any time period dt is therefore 
given by the equation:
E  =  (/Xj — A0) GRi-dt
The (strong) solution to the stochastic differential equation for mixed 
Poisson jump-Brownian motion process is:
t 
GRi ■ GRt—o J  exp[^/Xj — X(p —  — t 4-  crWt]dt 
0
To solve for the expected foreign fixed costs, we need to solve the expec­
tation of the stochastic exponential on right hand side:
t
Et [GRi] = Et[GRt=oJ exp{ /^Xj -  A0 -  t}. exp{aWt}.dt]
0
which implies
t
Et [GRi] =  GRt=oI  exp{ /^Xj -  Xcp -  t } .Et[exp{aWt]]dt
42
Solving the stochastic exponential as in the Appendix A2 above gives: 
Et[eyi\>{(7Wt}] -  exp{^aH )
We can now get rid of the expectation term  on the right hand side as 
everything else is deterministic. Since
t
Et [GRi] = G R t^ o J  exp{(/x^ -  A</>) t}dt 
0
starting at a time t* between t — 0 and t = oo and potentially operating 
forever, expected present value of fixed costs, for a country j multinational 
firm undertaking foreign direct investment in country i, is given by:
E f {  + G)].dt + eGRo + J
t* i*
j  + G)].dt + eGRo + E,.{ J  e-'^€{GRiJ>‘‘- ’^ -i'’>^‘e'’'^ ‘)dt}
= ~(H"' + G) + eGRo+P p — p \(j)
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Figure 2.2: Graph for the characteristic equation of the mixed Poisson 
jumi>Brownian motion stochastic process [parameter 7  on the x-axis and 
function /  (7 ) on the y-axis].
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3  F D I P olicy , Q u an tity  C o m p etitio n  and H eteroge­
n eous F irm s
3.1 In trod u ction
The importance of multinational firms has increased over time. Since the 
mid 1980s, the world has seen an unprecedented increase in FDI flows, which 
have increased much faster than both world income and trade (Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004). According to UNCTAD figures, multinational activity now 
accounts for more than a quarter of global output and nearly two-thirds of 
world trade.
Though the relative importance of multinational firms varies by industry, 
at the firm level, multi-nationality is positively associated with firm size and 
trade barriers, but negatively associated with plant-level scale economies. 
At the industry level, multinational activity is significantly higher in sectors 
which have high R&D expenditures and high fixed costs (i.e. employ a larger 
number of non-production workers or have high advertisement / sales expen­
diture), produce new and/or complex goods or feature a high productivity 
dispersion (Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple, 2004).
In this chapter I develop a model of firm heterogeneity with market power. 
Firms’ mark-ups are endogenous and directly proportional to  their respec­
tive market shares. My model is characterized by a long run industry equi­
librium where large and small firms coexist with varying degrees of market 
power; and the steepness of market power gradient varies one to one with 
the natural gradient of firm size and market shares in equilibrium. Strate­
gic interaction between domestic and foreign firms generates profit shifting 
across firms. Market size has scale effects. Measured productivity differences 
across firms makes it optimal for them to charge different mark-ups directly 
through market competition, rather than indirectly as feedback through the 
demand side of the economy. My model brings out potential gains in mar­
ket power as an additional reason for undertaking FDI in addition to rea­
sons already enshrined in the literature as proximity-concentration trade-off. 
Pro-competitive effect of trade liberalisation is also a result of strategic inter­
action between the firms. When the model is extended to endogenous FDI 
with asymmetric countries, it leads to interesting interactions between profit 
maximizing behaviour of multinational firms and the commercial policy en­
vironment in which they operate.
I will first mention some stylized facts about the long run industry equi­
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librium. A particularly consistent feature of empirical studies is the pres­
ence of considerable heterogeneity in size as well as measured productivity in 
almost all manufacturing industries (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum, 
2003). This heterogeneity exists in virtually all performance measures includ­
ing sales, productivity, capital/labour ratio, investment, R&D etc. Bart van 
Ark and Erik Monnikhof (1996) compared output and employment in manu­
facturing industries for five OECD countries over five decades and found that 
firms which employ more than 500 workers, constitute just 1.0 to 2.4 percent 
of the total number of firms operating within an industry, but account for 
the majority (54 to 67 percent) of output and value added in that industry. 
On the other hand, firms with less than 20 employees (i.e. small firms) ac­
count for as much as 60 to 85 percent of the total number of firms within 
the industry, but produce only 5 to 11 percent of total output and value 
added in tha t industry. A recent study of US firms by Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott (2005) found that top 1 percent of trading firms account for 81 per­
cent of US trade and top 10 percent account for as much as 96 percent, and 
that this market concentration in favour of large firms has in fact increased 
over time.^ Income inequality studies have famously talked about the Pareto 
principle (sometimes called the 80-20 rule), which says " 2 0  percent of human 
population owns 80 percent of total assets and wealth". It appears from 
the empirical literature tha t heterogeneity amongst manufacturing firms is 
even more acute. Large firms not only produce more output, but they also 
have a higher value added and measured productivity per worker. Measured 
productivity includes mark-ups, which in empirical studies are often inferred 
from the price-cost margins (PCM). A standard interpretation of the PCM 
findings is that large firms, even more so in concentrated industries, tend to 
enjoy a higher market power (James Tybout, 2002).
Melitz (2003) modelled intra-industry reallocations of trade liberalisation 
in the presence of Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition. Firms’ mark­
ups in his model are constant, and intra-industry re-allocation effects are 
not generated directly through market competition, but indirectly through 
factor market effects for which his model assumes an inelastic labour supply. 
Market size affects the number of firms (or varieties) in equilibrium, but not 
average revenue or profit per firm. To compare, I develop a model of firm 
heterogeneity with market power. The mark-ups are endogenous, market size 
has scale effects and intra-industry reallocation effects are generated directly
^The time line of their study is year 1993 to 2000.
46
through strategic interaction amongst firms. This mechanism is consistent 
with extreme concentration of economic activity across firms as brought out 
by the empirical literature mentioned above.
Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) develop a model for analyzing the effects of 
market size on trade, which endogenizes mark-ups with the help of a spe­
cialized demand system (first developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse, 
2002). The effect of market size now comes as a feedback through the de­
mand side of the economy via price elasticity of residual demand, and this 
in turn depends on the number of varieties produced in equilibrium (also 
called "toughness" of competition). The dynamics of their model depend on 
the relative distance of variable/ marginal costs from the zero-profit marginal 
cost cutoffs for which they do away with fixed costs of plant operation. The 
model I develop here also has endogenous mark-ups, and the market size 
affects mark-ups as well as firm scale. Further, my model is better suited for 
analysis of FDI policy as it is consistent with any demand system, strate­
gic interaction generates profit shifting across firms and interaction of FDI 
policy with profit maximizing behaviour of multinational firms generates a 
spectrum of welfare effects for the home and the host economies.^
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), henceforth BEJK (2003), 
developed a model of firm heterogeneity under Bertrand competition. This 
model also has endogenous mark-ups. However, because of the nature of 
market competition in their model, only one firm (the most efficient one) 
sells in one country in equihbrium. To compare, my model is based on 
Cournot competition and is characterized by an industry equilibrium where 
large and small firms coexist with varying degrees of market power, and the 
steepness of market power gradient varies one to one with natural gradient 
of firm size and market shares in equilibrium.
Helpman, Mehtz and Yeaple (2004), henceforth HMY (2004), extend the 
Melitz (2003) model of trade to outward FDI for US firms and show that 
firm’s choice of market access is driven by its relative productivity. Their 
model, like Melitz (2003), is based on monopolistic competition with CES 
preferences. Because their model is based on constant mark-ups, it is not 
possible to generate profit shifting effects of trade and FDI liberalisation on 
domestic firms, something my model is able to generate and is consistently
*In monopolistic competition models, FDI is unambiguously welfare improving as there 
is no profit shifting across firms and substitution of imports with foreign affiliate production 
lowers the price index in the host economy.
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observed in the empirical literature (see for example, Aitken and Harrison, 
1999; James Tybout, 2002 etc.).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a baseline model 
for the closed economy. Section 3 extends it to an open economy with FDI. 
Section 4 compares the implications of this model to those of a standard 
model of proximity-concentration trade-off. Section 5 gives a brief account 
of FDI regimes. Section 6  analyses the interaction between profit maximizing 
behaviour of multinational firms and the commercial policy environment in 
which they operate. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 C losed  E conom y
This is a model of oligopolistic competition with firm heterogeneity, where 
profits are explicitly consumed and could potentially be redistributed. I first 
set up a baseline model for the closed economy and derive its equilibrium 
conditions.
Consider a country with population P, a proportion of which are entre­
preneurs (E), the remaining are all workers (L):
P  = L ^ E  (63)
There are two homogeneous good sectors: X  and Y .
Entrepreneurship is specific to the X-sector. Each entrepreneur organizes 
and owns an X-sector firm. The supply of firms is limited by the population of 
entrepreneurs, as skills of workers and entrepreneurs are not inter-changeable.
Each worker maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility
u, = (64)
subject to the budget constraint
px -\-y = w (65)
where p  is the price of good X and w is the wage rate.
Good Y is produced by self-employed workers using a constant returns to 
scale technology, where one unit of labour produces one unit of the good. Its 
market is competitive and transport costless. Good Y  is treated as numeraire
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(its price set equal to one). Assuming diversified production, this normalizes 
the nominal wages to one.^
Profits are paid out in terms of the numeraire good Y. Entrepreneurs 
have a simple, linear utility function given by:
%  =  % (%%
Good X is produced using an increasing returns to scale technology, rep­
resented by a cost function C{x), that exhibits constant marginal costs (c)
and fixed overhead costs ( /) , both using inputs of labour given by:
C{x) = f  +  CX  (c) (67)
All firms share the same fixed costs, but variable costs vary systemati­
cally with firm’s productivity indexed by the reciprocal of marginal cost K 
Each entrepreneur (firm) draws his (its) marginal cost (productivity) from 
a common distribution g{c) with positive support over (0, o o ). Productivity 
distribution is common knowledge and draws of productivity are observed 
by all firms.
An example of such a productivity distribution could be the Zipf distri­
bution, which is a finite support, discrete power law distribution with the 
probability mass function:
E l l  i/« -
(68)
This rank-frequency formulation, also called the Zipf’s law, predicts that 
out of a total population of N elements, the frequency of elements (or elements 
divided into class intervals) is inversely proportional to their rank k; and ‘s’ 
is the slope parameter which defines degree of heterogeneity (see Figure 3.1 
on page74). In the limiting case as s tends to  zero, Zipf distribution tends to 
the discrete uniform distribution with a constant probability mass function 
1/N.^^ And as N tends to  infinity, the Zipf distribution tends to the Zeta
®Market clearing wage, under incomplete specialization, is determined by production 
technology in the competitive, constant returns to scale Y sector. I assume the demand 
parameters and factor endowments are such that production always remains diversified.
i^In other words, homogeneously distributed firms can be seen as a special case of the 
more commonly observed heterogeneous firm distribution.
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distribution, which is a discrete analogue of the Pareto distribution.^^ Axtell, 
2001 analysed the Census data of US manufacturing firms from the year 1988 
to 1997 and found that Zipf distribution fits the US data fairly well, and even 
though mean firm size increases from 1988 to 1997, the estimated value of 
the slope parameter remains remarkably constant.
Further, the assumption here is that X-sector firms play strategically a la 
Cournot. Hence, profit maximization yields the following pricing rule from 
first order conditions, which equates marginal revenue to the marginal cost:
P 1 -
Xi (c) 1
%
— c (69)
where, p  is the inverse demand function that a quantity setting firm takes 
as given, rj is the price elasticity of aggregate demand, Xi (c) is the quantity 
produced by an individual firm and X  is the aggregate output of all firms in 
the industry. In other words, firm heterogeneity in this model implies each 
firm faces a firm specific demand elasticity c* (c), which is a function of its 
marginal cost/productivity draw as shown below:
(c) —
y x
X i  (c) (70)
The above pricing rule can now be written in terms of the firm specific 
demand elasticity as follows:
P 1 - (71)
Thus, firm heterogeneity in this model, through the firm specific demand 
elasticity, also implies that quantity setting by firms is a function of the 
marginal cost/ productivity draws.
It is a property of the Cobb-Douglas utility functions that price elasticity 
of aggregate demand is one. This serves as a useful simplification device, 
as the proportional markup m^(c) for any individual X-sector firm is now 
simply equal to its market share:
mf(c) =
p — c 
P
X i  (c) 1 
X  77
Xi  j c )  
X
(72)
Pareto distribution is a continuous power law distribution often used to depict firm 
heterogeneity in monopolistic competition models like HMY(2004), Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2005) etc.
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For quantity setting, all tha t a firm needs to know is the structure of its 
demand function, the draws of productivity (own and other firms) and the 
production technology (fixed costs). Firms which cannot cover fixed costs 
with their potential mark-up revenues set zero quantities for production, and 
firms, which can exceed them, set positive quantities for production. In 
particular, the profit function is given by:
7Ti (c) =  max{0, Xi  (c) m i ( c )  -  /}  (73)
where Xi (c) is the firm’s output, /  is the fixed costs and m%(c) is the 
absolute markup defined below.
The same information that is needed for quantity setting is also sufficient 
for estimating profits. Only firms with cost draws c  <  c* find it profitable 
to produce in equilibrium, c* is the zero profit cost cutoff, such tha t some 
firm with a cost draw (c* — 6 )  <  c* produces with positive profits, whereas 
if another firm with a cost draw (c* + 5) > c* were to enter, it would earn 
negative profits and exit immediately. Thus, zero profits imply:
7 t ( c * )  =  X i ( c ) m i ( c )  -  f  = 0 (74)
m ( c )  the absolute mark-up is the gross profit per unit of output given by:
m { c ) = p — c  (75)
Good X is consumed by workers alone. The Cobb Douglas utility implies 
the following inverse Marshallian demand function (for good X):
(76)
Using equations 72 and 76 to substitute out the aggregate output of good 
X gives the following expression for the output of an individual X-sector firm:
Xi{c) (3L
p — c
(77)
Substituting out output and absolute markup expressions in the zero 
profit condition (equation 74) gives:
P [ p - c * )  = f (78)
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/  p9 )
which is equal to:
( I
\  P J
Rearranging this yields the following expression for the cut-off cost/ productivity 
level c*:
Tc = p (80)
In a world that is Cournot, quantity setting firms are only required to
know the structure of aggregate demand function, not the exact point on
which the markets would potentially operate. The aggregate output is simply 
the by-product of quantity setting by individual firms. And once quantity 
setting has determined individual and total outputs, price (or relative price) 
of X is determined by market clearing.
Aggregate demand for good X is given by equation 76 above. Since Y is 
consumed by both workers and entrepreneurs, aggregate demand for good Y 
is the sum of their respective Marshallian demands:
Y - Y l + Ye (81)
Aggregate demand of workers for good Y is derived from optimization of 
their Cobb-Douglas utilities:
Ifl =  (1 (82)
Entrepreneurs have linear utility functions, hence, their total expenditure 
on good Y is simply equal to the total profits II as stated below:
YE = n  = t , ^ i ( c )  (83)
i=l
Labour market clearing requires:
L — Lx -\- Ly — X ](/ Y  Cix(ci)) 4- (1 — /3)L 4- II (84)
We can now use both the goods and the labour market clearing to solve 
for the equilibrium price of X. Using equations 81-84, the solution for the 
equilibrium price of X (see Appendix B la  for details) is obtained as follows:
p = Ç ^  (85)
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Here, p  (without the hat) is the equilibrium price of X, n is the total 
number of firms producing positive output in equilibrium and Q is the 
sum of their respective marginal costs. Define the industry (unweighted) 
average variable costs as:
A V C  = (8 6 )
n
Equihbrium price of X is thus a markup over (unweighted) average variable 
costs:^^
p =  - ^ A V C  (87)
Notice the role of constant ‘one’ in the denominator. Larger the number 
of firms operating in equilibrium, smaller would the proportional mark-up of
price over average variable costs be and hence, closer the industry equilibrium
would be to the competitive outcome.
Having solved for the equilibrium price of X, zero-profit cost cutoff c* can 
be written as a function of the fundamentals (equilibrium price p, fixed costs 
/ ,  demand parameter /? and labour endowment L):
c* ip) = p 1 - (88)
I derive a few more results that would be useful during the course of 
this chapter. Ratios of outputs and mark-ups for any two X-sector firms 
producing in equilibrium are given by:
=  =  (89)
X  (C2) m  (c g )  p - C 2
In other words, as productivity increases, not only do the firms become 
larger, but they also enjoy higher mark-ups. Equations 69, 72 and 89 together
^^The weighted average variable costs are given by equations 90 and 91 read with Ap­
pendix B ib . Heterogeneity implies more productive (low cost) firms have greater weights 
(market shares); and hence, true markup of price over weighted average variable costs 
is greater than the difference between price and unweighted average variable costs. If, 
however, the firms were homogeneous, the unweighted and the weighted average would be 
the same.
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imply tha t with firm heterogeneity, there is a natural gradation of firms in 
terms of their market shares (output) and market power (mark-up of price 
over marginal cost). It is for both these reasons tha t larger firms in this model 
enjoy higher profits.
Further, similar to Melitz (2003), it is possible to solve an aggregation 
problem and find out what the profits of an average productivity homoge­
neous firm would be such that the total number of firms and aggregate profits 
in the industry remain the same (proof: see Appendix Bib):
7t { c )  =  f p - c ( p ) Y  ^
p - c * { p ) J
(90)
where ir (c) is the profit of an average productivity firm and c (p) is its 
weighted productivity given by:
c (p) =  p - -\/p2 +  (91)
V n n
Thus, n  number of homogeneous firms each earning a profit t t  (c ) would 
produce the same aggregate profit as the profits of individual heterogeneous 
firms added together:
n-K (c) =  n  (92)
W hat about the effects of market size? The number of entrepreneurs, 
and hence firms, increases proportionately with country’s population (market 
size). Larger markets are associated with lower prices and mark-ups, while 
output per firm rises unambiguously, as direct effect of market size (through 
labour endowment L) outweighs its indirect effect through prices (proofs: 
see Appendix Blc). Thus, like Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), market size in 
this model affects both mark-ups and firm scale, but the difference is that 
here these effects are generated directly through market competition amongst 
firms rather than indirectly as feedback through a specialized demand system. 
Further, the effect of market size on cost cut-off is ambiguous as the effects 
of labour endowment and prices are in opposite directions (see equation 8 8  
above).
These findings are consistent with the empirical literature. Campbell 
and Hopenhayn, 2002 studied the effects of market size on size distribution 
of establishments in thirteen retail industries across 225 US cities. They 
found that in nearly every industry they studied, establishments were larger
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in larger cities. They also found that is was only in four out of thirteen 
industries that dispersion of establishment sizes depended on market size, and 
there too, the relationship was ambiguous as a weakly positive relationship 
between market size and dispersion of establishment size existed only in three 
industries, while in the fourth industry this relationship was negative. Such 
findings are consistent with this model, as discrete firms imply, a change in 
the cost-cutoff may not always be large enough to  affect the size distribution 
of operating firms. In general, Campbell and Hopenhayn (2002) observed 
tha t ohgopoly based models are easier to reconcile with empirical facts than 
monopolistic competition based models are.
3.3  O pen  E conom y w ith  F D I
I will now extend the above analysis to  an open economy with FDI. I 
assume there is no international trade and the firms can only serve the foreign 
market through FDI. This is a simplifying device to enable me focus on the 
endogenous decision of firms, whether or not to  undertake the FDI, and what 
the welfare implications would be in light of the FDI policy environment in 
which they operate?
3.3.1 T he Basic Setup
Let us assume there are two countries indexed by j (j= l,2). j ’ will 
denote the other country. Both countries follow a liberal FDI regime and 
freely permit foreign companies to operate within their respective boundaries. 
Superscript ‘d ’ stands for domestic and ‘f ’ for foreign production. Fixed costs 
of operating a foreign affiliate ‘/ /  ’ are strictly higher than fixed costs of pure 
domestic production 'fd  (for reasons like need for establishing a transnational 
network, for providing headquarter services etc. in addition to meeting the 
fixed costs of plant operation).
f i  >  h  (93)
Profit function for an individual firm i in country j is now given by the 
function:
TTij (c) =  max{0,7rf- (c)} +  max{0, 7t{- (c)} (94)
pure domestic firm does not need a separate headquarter.
55
where Trfj (c) are the profits from domestic production and ( c ) are the 
profits from foreign affiliate production.
X-sector firms continue to play strategically a la Cournot.
Pj
I =  Cij (95)
Markets are segmented in the sense that firms in each country play an in­
dependent quantity setting game, and prices may differ across the markets.^^ 
Profits from domestic market sales (country j firms) are:
(c) =  4  (c) my (c) -  fd (96)
Profits from foreign affiliate sales (country j ’ firms operating in country 
j) are:
(c) =  (c) m i^y (c) -  f i  (97)
Proposition 1: Higher fixed costs of multinational operations ensure par­
titioning of firms by multinational status such that c*^ / < Cj, where marginal 
cost (productivity) cutoff for domestic production is:
Pj 1 - ' AfiLj (98)
and marginal cost (productivity) cutoff for foreign affiliate production is:
(99)Cfj — Pj 1 -
f i
Proof: see Appendix B2a.
Let nj be the number of firms operating in country j and n /j be the 
number of firms successfully undertaking foreign direct investment abroad. 
Similarly, define ny  and n^y for the other country.
'^*1 am assuming the goods market arbitrage is not possible, that is consumers in one 
market cannot buy/sell goods in the other market to take advantage of the arbitrage 
opportunities.
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As in the case of closed economy, we can solve for the equilibrium price 
(proof: see Appendix B2b)
Since markets are segmented, price in the other country need not neces­
sarily be the same, and is given by:
Z  c* +  Z  Q
As in the case of a closed economy, these prices pin down the unique 
zero-profit cost (productivity) cutoffs: c ,^ Cy^ , c*,, c* ,^.
Inward FDI has a two fold effect on the host economy, a pro-competitive 
effect and a business-stealing efifect This is implied by the two propositions 
below:
Proposition 2: Inward FDI leads to a fall in equilibrium price in the host 
economy (pro-competitive effect). This also implies a fall in equilibrium cost 
(productivity) cutoff Cj.
P; < Pj.
Proof: see Appendix B2c.
This effect is potentially welfare enhancing and its implications are further 
explored in the sub-section below.
Proposition 3: Given a level of productivity, for a firm that serves only 
the domestic market, domestic output, when the economy is opened to inward 
FDI, is lower, than under autarky. This also implies a fall in domestic profits 
of host country firms (business stealing effect).
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(c) <  (c)
Proof: see Appendix B2d.
Inward FDI increases market shares of foreign firms at the cost of pro­
ducers in the domestic economy. This ‘profit shifting’ or ‘business steahng’ 
effect is the result of strategic interaction between domestic and foreign firms. 
It is not possible to generate this effects through monopolistic competition 
models of FDI like HMY(2004). As a result of this business stealing effect, 
fall in domestic sales profit of an individual firm in the host economy is given 
by:
Anfj (c) =  7t“ - ( c )  -  TT^ j (c) =  PL 1 -  —  
Pja
- I I ------
Pj
(102)
where pja is the equilibrium price under autarky and pj is the price under 
open economy (with FDI).
At the same time, firms which successfully undertake affiliate production 
abroad generate additional profits from foreign affihate sales given by:
\  2
p y - c
A 7 t{j  ( c )  =  7t{j  (C ) -  0 =  p l y
P y
(103)
Thus, total change in profit revenues for firms in country j are equal to:
n j j
(104)
 rij
Allj =  g  A7t{j ( c )  -  ^  A TT ÿ ( c )
i=l i=l
Notice that at Cy^ , the productivity cutoff for being a successful multina­
tional, foreign profits are exactly equal to zero and there is loss of domestic 
profit revenues. Only firms with sufficiently high productivity gain overall 
profits, when additional profits generated by foreign affiliate sales outweigh 
the loss of profit revenues due to business stealing effect in the domestic 
economy. Aggregate profits for the host economy as a whole can thus also 
go in any direction depending on whether total profits generated by foreign 
affiliate sales outweigh the total loss of profits due to business stealing effect 
of inward FDI in the host economy.
Further, like in the case of a closed economy, it is possible to solve an 
aggregation problem for an open economy with FDI. Profits Ifj for an average 
productivity homogeneous firm in country j would now be:
7T,- =  / Pj -  Cj (Pj)Pj <  (pj)
-  1 +  P'Tfjfl
Pj' -  c/j jPj')
-  1 (105)
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where p r j  =  is the proportion of country j firms undertaking for­
eign direct investment abroad, Cj {pj) is the cost of an average productivity 
domestic firm selling in the domestic market and Cfj (py) is the cost of an 
average productivity country j multinational firm selling in the foreign mar­
ket. As in the case of the closed economy, average costs are a function of the 
respective equilibrium prices.
Similarly, for country j ’ this expression would be:
Try =  / 'Pj' -  S" f e ')
Pj’ -  *  (p /)
- 1 - 1 (106)
In terms of the average profits, total change in profit revenues can also 
be expressed (respectively for country j and j ’) as follows:
AHj =  UfjTrj (c) -  UjAnj  (c) (107)
d (108)
3.3.2 E ffects on  W elfare
Let us assume the social welfare function W  (u) is utilitarian. All workers 
and entrepreneurs in this model are identical to  each other. Hence, welfare 
of workers and entrepreneurs is given by:
(«) =  Z] “  (“ 'l) (109)
1 =  1
(«) =  E  « (w«) (110)
e=l
Welfare of any individual worker is represented by the indirect utility 
function
=  ( /Sf  (1 -  /3)‘- '’ (p ,)-^  (Pv)'“ '^ '  ^  (111)
Since wages and price of Y are normalized to one, total welfare for workers 
in country j is given by
w„  (u) =  ( p f  (1 -  (p)-^ Lj = k  (p)-^ Lj
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( 112)
Pro-competitive effect of inward FDI is a change in the utilities of workers 
given by:
A W ^{u ) = k ( p f  (113)
In other words, change in aggregate welfare of workers is a function of 
change in the equihbrium price weighted by the consumption parameter P, a 
constant k (defined by equation 112 above) and market size L. As before, pja 
is the equilibrium price under autarky and Pj is the equilibrium price under 
open economy with FDI. Since, domestic price falls following the opening up 
to FDI, welfare of workers must rise.
Entrepreneurs have linear utility functions, hence, their aggregation is 
simpler. The effect of profit rents on entrepreneurs’ welfare is equal to:
T l J  j  T t j
AIFe (u) = A y  = Y l A 7t{^  (c) -  ^  Airfj (c) =  (c) -  nj.Airfj (c) (114)
i= l
where A y  is the change in consumption of good Y, Att^ (c) are the profit 
revenues earned by country j multinational firms abroad and Anfj  (c) is the 
loss of profit revenues of domestic firms because of the business stealing effect 
of inward FDI in the host economy. Hence, there is an ambiguous change in 
the welfare of entrepreneurs as aggregate profits could either fall or rise.
Assuming there is no extra social weight on utility of workers, total change 
in welfare is given by:^^
A W { u )  = A W ^ ( u )  + AWe{u)  (115)
k ( p f  -  P j f  )  +  ( l  -  ^ )
As we can see, there are three welfare effects in this model. First, gain 
in workers utility due to pro-competitive effect of inward FDI and resulting 
fall in the domestic equilibrium price. Second, loss of profit revenues for 
the domestic firms due to the business steahng effect of inward FDI. Third,
'■’If there is an extra social weight on utility of workers, this can be captured by intro­
ducing a social weight parameter multiplying the aggregate utility of workers. This does 
not affect the results qualitatively.
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there is a gain in profit revenues from the affiliate production in the foreign 
economy. The three effects together imply FDI is not an unambiguously 
welfare improving proposition. There could in fact be a loss in welfare, if the 
pro-competitive effect of inward FDI is very weak and domestic firms are not 
productive enough to earn sufficient profit rents abroad. A good example 
of such a scenario would be a developing economy, where domestic firms are 
not productive enough to invest abroad and intvard FDI could drive domestic 
welfare either way. On the other hand, if the pro-competitive effect of inward 
FDI is strong enough to  override the business stealing effect by itself, or the 
profit rents country j ’s multinationals earn abroad are so large that together 
with the pro-competitive effect of inward FDI they override the loss of profit 
revenues to inward FDI in the host economy, FDI would improve welfare.
3 .4  P rox im ity -C on cen tra tion  Trade-ofF
Brainard (1993) demonstrated a trade-off between proximity and concen­
tration advantages, whereby higher trade costs and increasing returns at the 
corporate level relative to plant costs are associated with greater multina­
tional activity. For reasons of analytical tractabihty, I will assume for this 
section tha t the two countries are symmetric (j= j’). A firm now has three 
possibilities: produce purely for domestic sales, produce for both domestic
sales and export, or become multinational i.e. produce both for domestic
and foreign market sales. As before, let fa be the fixed costs of domestic 
production. Trade involves both fixed and variable costs. Let fx be the total 
fixed costs of export production (including fixed costs of trade) and r  be the 
variable trade costs, which are assumed to be iceberg.^® Let / /  be the total 
fixed costs of multinational operation, which include not only fixed costs of 
operating a foreign affiliate, but also fixed costs of providing headquarter 
services and creating trans-national networks.
Profits from domestic sales are given by
(c) =  xfj (c) mfj (c) -  fd (116)
Profits from export sales are given by
(c) =  ^ij (c) (c) -  fx (117)
Since, A  is strictly greater than fd  and iceberg trade costs, r , are strictly greater than 
zero, exporters are more productive than pure domestic producers.
61
Profits from foreign affiliate sales are given by
(c) -  (c) m{j (c) -  f i  (118)
Profit function for an individual firm in country i is now given by:
TTij (c) =  max{0, nfj (c) +  max{0, max{7r^ (c ), 7r{j (c)}} (119)
Similarly, output of an individual firm in country i is given by:
Xij (c) =  max{0 , (c) +  max{0 , max{z^ (c ), x{  ^ (c)}} (1 2 0 )
It is a consistent finding in empirical literature that multinational firms 
axe more productive than non-multinational exporters. As in the Helpman, 
Melitz and Yeaple (2004) model, this partitioning is achieved in this model 
by imposing an additional condition on the fixed costs of multinational op­
eration:
Proposition 5: Given the stylized fact that multinational firms are more 
productive than non-multinational exporters, partitioning of exporting firms 
by FDI status can be achieved iff the following relationship is satisfied:
f i  > 4---- —
Proof: see Appendix B3b.
The intuition is that compared to a pure trading operation, multinational 
operations involve high fixed activities like setting up a foreign plant, setting 
up/expanding the corporate headquarter, costs of creating transnational net­
works etc.
Partitioning of firms by export and multinational status also implies exis­
tence of three marginal cost/ productivity cutoffs as defined in the proposition 
below:
Proposition 4  ^ Relationship between the three marginal cost (productivity) 
cutoffs is given by:
4a) Cfj — Pj
h
(121)
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46)
4c) c ) j = p j
(122)
(123)
Proof: see Appendix B3a.
Thus, relative distance between the three cost cutoffs depends on the 
magnitude of fixed costs and iceberg (variable) trade costs. In this model, 
the relationship between the three cost cutoffs serves another useful purpose.
As will be evident from the condition 4c, higher (variable) trade costs 
imply a relatively higher cost cut-off (lower productivity) for undertaking 
a foreign direct investment; in other words, greater multinational activity. 
Further, we can rearrange condition 4a as follows:
(124)
Now, given that for operating firms absolute mark-up {jpj — is positive, 
lower corporate level fixed costs compared to  pure plant level fixed costs (that 
is larger firm-level scale economies compared to plant-level scale economies) 
also implies a relatively higher cost cut-off (lower productivity) for under­
taking a foreign direct investment, that is, greater multinational activity. 
This model therefore replicates the proximity-concentration trade-off within 
a framework of heterogeneous firms. In fact it goes a step further.
Proposition 6: Given a level of productivity above the threshold cutoff for  
FDI, for a firm that serves foreign markets through foreign direct investment, 
output and markup of foreign affiliate is greater than what its export output 
would have been had it chosen exporting as the mode of foreign market access
I.e.
and
Proof: see Appendix B3c.
4  (c) >  (c)
m(j (c) >  mfj (c)
(125)
(126)
Given a level of fixed costs, at the level of cost cutoff threshold for FDI
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^  i ^h)  ~  '^ij ( 4 ;)
whereas for a firm operating above this cutoff threshold for FDI
(c) > T^ ij (c) (128)
Thus, FDI leads not only to an increase in output, but also to an increase 
in endogenous mark-ups (market power), and due to both these reasons, to 
higher profits for erstwhile trading firms. Thus, firms undertake FDI not 
just for reasons enshrined in literature as proximity-concentration trade-off, 
but also because they hope to increase their market power, thereby earning 
higher profits.
3.5  A  b r ief su rvey  o f  F D I P o lic ies
National Governments care about FDI inflows, and given the disparity of 
opinion tha t exists over positive and negative effects of inward FDI, design 
policies with actual and potential multinational behaviour in mind. While 
many countries have explicit FDI regimes, others have commercial policy 
regimes, which among other things, attem pt to modulate behaviour of multi­
national firms in line with some domestic objectives. Another common fea­
ture of the foreign investment environment worldwide has been the so called 
‘incentive competition’ between national governments to attract FDI into 
their respective countries.
To write a comparative discourse on FDI regimes of individual countries 
would be a voluminous exercise beyond the scope of this chapter. For reasons 
of brevity, I give an overview of such policies by classifying them into two 
broad categories:
3.5.1 FD I policies that affect the distribution o f  profits betw een  
th e two countries
Such policies usually take the form of caps or limits on foreign equity own­
ership for any entity/firm incorporated within the boundaries of a country. 
They vary from a complete ban on foreign ownership at one extreme to unre­
stricted foreign ownership at the other. Further, within a country such equity 
limits vary from industry to industry, and within a particular industry, they
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vary over time. Such restrictions are usually severe in strategic sectors. Even 
when countries, by law, have liberal FDI regimes, nationalist fervour and do­
mestic politics may force the Government to interfere with foreign ownership 
and hence, distribution of profits from foreign investment between the coun­
tries. Transfer pricing is another strategy, internal to a multinational firms, 
whereby firms set prices on their internal transactions in such a way that it 
moves earnings between the subsidiaries.
Another very important element of FDI policies are laws applicable to 
capital taxation and how they regulate mobile capital and multinational en­
terprise. Multinational firms, in general, are affected by tax systems of both 
the home and host economies. Multinational investment is also affected by 
tax treaties, if any, between the home and the host countries. If capital 
taxes are source based, entire tax income from profits is retained by the host 
economy. If, on the other hand, they are residence based, entire tax  income 
from multinational investment is retained by the home economy. While ear­
lier studies (Wheeler and Mody, 1992) found tax differentials have negligible 
effect on FDI flows, consensus emerging from recent studies (Hines, 1999; De- 
vereux and Griffith, 1998) is that taxes do m atter for choice of multinational 
location. In any case, such elements of the commercial policy environment 
directly affect the distribution of profit-incomes between the countries in a 
similar way as the foreign equity cap does. Hence, foreign equity cap is used 
here in a generic sense and is thought of as capturing a variety of policies 
that affect the distribution of profit incomes between the countries.
3.5.2 FD I Policies that affect the costs o f  foreign investm ent
A complete ban on foreign investment, like non-tariff trade barriers, is equiv­
alent to an infinitely high fixed cost of foreign investment. Most FDI regimes 
prescribe routes for foreign investment which are more tortuous than those 
for domestic investment. This increases fixed costs of foreign investment 
both directly and indirectly (in terms of the opportunity cost of time-cost 
over-runs). Political and economic instability adds to fixed costs of foreign in­
vestment by increasing the option value of uncertainty. Financial subsidies, 
which essentially take the form of government grants, also play some role 
in the choice of multinational location, especially between relatively similar 
economies. Providing subsidized infrastructure or public services, including 
preferential treatment for foreign exchange, all fall into the category of FDI 
policies of this type.
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Similarly, there could be subsidy policies that tend to make foreign in­
vestment more attractive by bringing down the variable cost of operating 
a foreign affiliate. Falling into this category are tax holidays, which take 
the form of exemptions from indirect taxes for specified periods; exemptions 
from import and/or export duties. Some countries go a step further and pro­
vide cheap electricity and subsidized inputs/raw  materials to multinational 
entrants. Such policies are commonly implemented as an incentive pack­
age in special economic zones, a strategy successfully implemented by many 
countries in East and South-East Asia.
It is straight forward to model FDI policies of the second type, as they 
are basically subsidies that bring down fixed or variable costs of foreign in­
vestment. I will concentrate, in the next section on FDI policies of the first 
type i.e. policies which affect the distribution of profit incomes between the 
countries and are commonly summarized by the term ‘FDI regimes’.
3 .6  F D I R eg im es and W elfare
I now return to the asymmetric countries framework of Section 3. Welfare 
effects of FDI depend on the interaction between profit maximizing behaviour 
of multinational firms and the welfare maximizing objectives of the central 
planner (national government).
3.6.1 U nilateral FD I w ith  Policy
Let us assume country ]=2 follows a restrictive foreign investment regime and 
does not permit any foreign direct investment within its b o rd e rs .C o u n try  
j = l  permits FDI, but regulates it with a policy regime. It is the central 
planner which decides and implements the policy regime. Fixed costs of 
operating a foreign affiliate are borne entirely by the foreign entrepreneurs.
As before, inward FDI in country 1 has a ‘pro-competitive’ effect, by low­
ering the price of good X and a ‘business stealing’ effect by taking away some 
profits and market shares of country I ’s domestic firms. Country I ’s firms 
in this case cannot earn multinational profits abroad. If the pro-competitive 
effect overrides the business stealing effect, the central planner would wel­
come inward FDI. If not, the central planner may like to intervene through 
a policy regime.
^Equivalently, none of the country 1 firms are productive enough to invest abroad.
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Let us assume country I ’s central planner imposes an ownership restric­
tion A, which prescribes the percentage upper limit of equity tha t can be 
owned by a foreign entrepreneur (remaining is equally distributed between 
the domestic entrepreneurs). Assuming foreign entrepreneurs exhaust all 
profit-making opportunities, the host country (country 1 ) would still gain 
welfare (from inward FDI), if the value of this policy parameter is above the 
threshold defined below:
Proposition 7: In cases where business stealing effect of inward FDI is 
stronger than its pro-competitive effect, fo r  the host country to be welfare 
neutral to inward FDI the level of equity cap A should be such that
1 — A =
pTfiUiP ( l  -  ^ )  1
(129)
and if  lower (higher 1 — A^  than this, welfare for the home country would 
improve unambiguously.
Proof: see Appendix B4a.
If the pro-competitive effect is stronger than the business stealing effect, 
the above proposition implies a value of A >  1 (i.e. no policy intervention 
needed as inward FDI is unambiguously welfare improving). At the other 
extreme, would be a floor value, A =  A, below which the foreign entrepreneur 
would lose all management control and any policy prescription below this 
level would practically shut out inward FDI from the host economy. This 
floor level could be interpreted as the cut-off between direct and portfolio 
investment.^^ Hence, upper and lower limits for this policy parameter are 
[A ^  ^ ^  1] and any FDI policy would work only between these two extremes.
As already mentioned, effects similar to  ownership restrictions can be 
achieved through capital taxation, assuming capital taxes are retained and 
redistributed within the host economy. The floor value of the policy pa­
rameter, A, would in this case be interpreted as the highest capital taxation 
rate (1 — A) that would practically drive out foreign direct investment from 
the host economy.
UN defines management control in this case as owning 10 percent or more of the 
ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated firm or its equivalent for an unincor­
porated firm; while lower ownership shares are known as portfolio investment.
'^^ In this case, capital taxes are redistributed to the domestic entrepreneurs in the form 
of numeraire good Y.
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3.6.2 B ilateral FD I w ith  Policy
Let us introduce a modification to  the above scenario. Say now, the central 
planner in country 2 permits FDI, which may be either welfare improving 
(pro-competitive effect stronger than business stealing effect with Ag =  1 ); or 
potentially welfare decreasing (pro-competitive effect weaker than business 
stealing effect), but regulated by a welfare neutral policy regime A2 such that 
Ag 6  [A, 1]. Let us assume for a moment that county I ’s central planner takes 
Ag as given. Welfare neutral solution for country I ’s central planner would 
now be as follows:
Proposition 8: Taking the stated FDI Policy of country 2, Ag, as given, 
the welfare neutral solution of FDI Policy, Aj, for country 1 ’s central planner 
would be:
n i A n f  (c) -  k (p j ^  -  p f f  )  L i -  p r / in i7r( (c) .A^
1 — Aj =  J—  (130)
prf2ri2T^2 (c)
Proof: see Appendix B4b.
In other words, the welfare neutral FDI pohcy now depends on the policy 
regime of the other country. There could in fact be three cases:
Case 1: If the pro-competitive effect is, by itself, stronger than business- 
stealing effect in both the countries, inward FDI is, by itself, unambiguously 
welfare improving for both the countries and free FDI would be the optimal 
policy for both the countries ( i.e. Ai, A2 =  1 ).
Case 2: If the pro-competitive effect is stronger than the business-stealing 
effect in one country, but weaker than it in the other; the unambiguously 
welfare improving country would permit free FDI ( i.e. Aj =  1), while the 
other country would take this policy parameter as given and fix its policy 
parameter at the welfare neutral level A* as given by the proposition 8  above. 
If even the floor value A is welfare losing for the other country, its central 
planner would restrict all FDI and we would be back to the world of unilateral 
FDI described earlier.
Case 3: If FDI is potentially welfare decreasing in both the countries (pro- 
competitive effect weaker than the business stealing effect), central planners 
in the two countries would play a policy game over division of multinational 
profits between the two countries and the optimal solution would be a Nash 
equilibrium in FDI policies. In this case, the net welfare effect of FDI in 
country 1 would be:
68
AHY* =  ( f t  ^ -  P\a )  L i- n iA w f  (c)+\2pr/ini7r{ (c)+(l-Ai)p7-/2n27r^ (c)
(131)
and the net welfare effect of FDI in country 2 would be:
a w / *  =  k (p j^  -  P2/ )  L2-ri2A i4  (c)+Xiprf2n2ivi (c)+ (l-A 2)pr/in i7r( (c)
(132)
Of the four terms on the right hand side of respective welfare functions, 
the first is the pro-competitive effect, the second is the business stealing effect 
and the last two terms are the division of multinational profits between the 
two countries. Notice that Ai and A2 are competitive in the sense that they 
have opposite effects on each country’s welfare. Welfare functions show that 
bilateral FDI policy is essentially a question of dividing total multinational 
profits between the two countries. But competitive policy actions potentially 
erode the incentives for multinational firms to invest abroad. If country 1 
decreases the value of its policy choice parameter A% in a unilateral attempt 
to improve its welfare, it would simultaneously decrease welfare in country 
2 .
Further, total potentially welfare decreasing effect of inward FDI for the 
two countries together, is the aggregate difference between the business steal­
ing effects and the pro-competitive effects for the two countries as given be­
low:
n i A n f  (c) -f naATT^  (c) -  k ^ Li  -  k “  P2a )  ^ 2  (133)
There could now be three further sub-cases:
Case 3a: If the total multinational profits are insufficient to cover the total 
potentially welfare decreasing effect of inward FDI, the autarky equilibrium 
will Pareto dominate and would be the unique policy solution.
Case 3b: If the total multinational profits are equal to the total poten­
tially welfare decreasing effect of inward FDI, Nash equilibrium would be a 
combination of welfare neutral FDI policies A^  and Ag, which are the min­
imum payoffs the respective central planners would find acceptable. Any 
unilateral deviation (for example decreasing A% below A )^ would make FDI a 
welfare losing proposition for the other country and would invite retaliatory
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action threatening to push the countries back into autarky. Intuitively, it 
says that if the FDI is a potentially welfare decreasing proposition for both 
the countries, the best the two country’s central planner can do together is 
to  have a welfare neutral FDI regime so tha t no country looses welfare in 
moving from autarky to FDI.
The reaction functions of the two central planners can be derived (for 
details see Appendix B4c) as follows:
prf2n2ni{c) + k ( p ï ^ - p î ^ ) L i - n i A w i { c )  pr,,ni-a{ (c)
M   ---------------------------------7—r------------------------i------------ 7 7 ^pTf^n^vi (c) prfpi^ni^ (c)
(134)
and
pr/ini7r{(c) +  A :(p 7 ^ -p jf)L 2 -n 2 A îr^ (c ) p r {£)
^2 {-'i) = ---------------------------------------713:----------------------------1--------------713:-^ 1prfiniit[ (c) prfiniw{ (c)
(135)
Notice that Aj and Ag are not negatively, but positively related. The two 
country’s reactions functions are positively sloped in (Ai, Ag) space; they in 
fact have equal slopes and overlap each other (for details see Appendix B4c).
This implies we do not have a unique Nash equilibrium, but a sequence of 
equilibria given by pairs of optimal values Aj and Ag tha t lie on the interval 
Aj, Ag G [A, 1] and solve the system of simultaneous equations represented by 
reaction functions above. Autarky equilibrium would be an additional Nash 
equilibrium as it gives equivalent payoffs.
Case 3c: If the total multinational profits are greater than total poten­
tially welfare decreasing effect of inward FDI, the policy game would be 
played over sharing this surplus. Assuming for simplicity that two countries 
have equal bargaining power (like in equal vote based WTO system), Nash 
equilibrium would be a combination of FDI policies A^  and Ag, such that 
each country get half of this surplus, which I will denote by fl. The reaction 
functions of the two central planners would now be given by (for details see 
Appendix B4c):
p r f2'ri2'ïïi (c) -k k )  Li -  nj Avrf (c) -  H/ 2  p r f in i7r{ (c)
prf2ri27vi (c) priu 2 'ïïi (c)
(136)
70
and
prfniTrf (c) +  k { p /  -  )  Lj -  njAjr^ (c) -  fi/2  prf^n^i^ i (c)
a; (Ai ) = ---^ ----------------------------------------------+ "  "  ;  _ A.
p r /in iv i (c) pr/iniJT^j (c)
(137)
As before, the two reactions functions are positively sloped in (Ai, A2) 
space, have equal slopes and overlap each other. Again there is no unique 
Nash equilibrium, but a sequence of equihbria given by pairs of optimal 
values Aj and Ag that He on the interval A^ , Ag G [A, 1] and solve the system 
of simultaneous equations represented by reaction functions above. The only 
difference compared to Case 3b is that autarky equilibrium is now Pareto 
dominated by these equilibria.
As far as the two central planners are concerned, the multiple equilibria 
in Case 3b and Case 3c are Pareto equivalent (because the aggregate country 
welfare remains unchanged between them). The problem remains, can we 
find a focal point to refine these equilibria further? Or in other words, if the 
two countries have to agree to a common policy rule, what should such a 
common policy rule be?
3.6.3 FD I Policy and Investm ent R egim es
We have seen in the Case 3b and Case 3c above tha t although FDI is po­
tentially welfare decreasing for both the countries, they could still agree to a 
policy rule A^ , Ag G [A, 1], which is welfare neutral for both the countries when 
simultaneously opened up to inward FDI. But there is no unique solution, 
rather a sequence of multiple equilibria that are Pareto equivalent. We need 
some mechanism or process tha t leads the players (in this case both coun­
try ’s central planners) to refine these equilibria further and reach a unique, 
mutually agreed solution.
One way to refine these equilibria is to have a rule based international 
investment regime overseen by some international watchdog like the WTO 
tha t forces both countries to select the most liberal amongst the multiple 
Pareto equivalent equilibria. The other way could be, for both countries to 
enter into a bilateral investment treaty, that selects the most liberal amongst 
the multiple Pareto equivalent equilibria. The most liberal FDI equilibrium
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in this case would be the highest optimal value pair A2 that lies on the 
interval [A, 1].
A plausible explanation for the driving force behind the two central plan­
ners to enter into a bilateral investment treaty could be lobbying by multina­
tional firms to choose the least restrictive amongst alternative FDI policies 
possible. This is not an explicit model of lobby formation, but it is reason­
able to  expect so if the lobbying power of firms is proportional to the profits 
they make. Multinational firms in this model are larger and make larger 
profits than purely domestic firms, while workers, who earn a wage income, 
are indifferent between the two modes of production. In the real world, FDI 
is regulated by a few rules agreed under the international investment regime 
(also called the trade related investment measures or TRIMS), while the bulk 
of FDI is covered by bilateral investment treaties between mutually investing 
(i.e. bilateral FDI) countries.
3 .7  Sum m ary
This is a model of firm heterogeneity with market power. The mark-ups are 
endogenous and responsive to toughness of market competition. The model 
is characterized by a long run equilibrium where small and large firms coexist 
with varying degrees of market power and steepness of market power gradient 
varies one to  one with the natural gradient of firm size and market shares in 
equilibrium. Market size has firm scale effects and the model is consistent 
with stylized facts as reported in the literature.
In this chapter, I first setup a baseline model for the closed economy, 
which is then extended to open economy with endogenous FDI. It not only 
explains profit shifting or business stealing effect of inward FDI in the host 
economy, but it also brings out potential gains in market power and prof­
its as additional reasons for undertaking FDI in addition to reasons already 
enshrined in literature as proximity-concentration trade-off. When extended 
to  analysis of FDI policy regimes, this model leads to a rich interaction be­
tween profit maximizing behaviour of multinational firms and the commercial 
policy environment in which they operate.
FDI is not an unambiguously welfare improving proposition. While firms 
maximize their individual profits, overall welfare effect depends on how re­
turns from foreign investment are distributed between the residents of the 
home and the host economies. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that this
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is what the national governments attem pt to do with their respective FDI 
policy regimes. This paper provides a formal basis for the same. This model 
also brings out the utility of multilateral investment regime and bilateral 
investment treaties in refining multiple Nash equilibria to ensure that most 
liberal FDI policy regime is implemented worldwide.
To summarize, this model provides a useful alternative to monopolistic 
competition models of firm heterogeneity to study intra-industry reallocation 
effects of FDI and to analyse the welfare implications of FDI Policy. It can be 
used in a variety of settings and is clearly the most appropriate for industries 
where a small number of domestic and foreign firms interact strategically.
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F ig u re  3.1: P robability mass function of Zipf D istributions for different 
values of the slope param eter ‘s’. A larger value of the  slope param eter 
implies greater firm heterogeneity, th a t is greater relative frequency for firms 
th a t lie in a class interval w ith a higher rank.
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3.8  A p p en d ix  B
3.8.1 B1 : Closed Econom y
B la) Solving for Equilibrium Price:
There are two ways to  solve for the equilibrium price.
Method 1: Use goods market clearing and the Walras’ Law:
In equilibrium, total demand for good X must equal its supply:
Substituting out the output supply function for an individual firm
P i^l r
simplifying further yields
P =  Z  (P -  c%)
i= l
or
P = n p - J 2 ^ ii=l
rearranging which yields
Method 2: Using the labour market clearing condition and the production 
technology
L —  Lx " b  Ly
L =  Z  ( /  "b Ci.Xi (c)) +  (1 — /?) L +  n
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Expanding further
L -  t  ( /  +  c a L  ( ^ ) )  +  (1  -  /3) i  +  t
which is equal to
L  — n f  +  (5L ^  Ci I — -— i +  L — /3L +  /?L Yl
Û V P
simplifying further yields
P  ^ =  Z  Q (P -  Ci) +  E  (P -  Ci)'
i= l i= l
expanding the terms in brackets
P^  =  P E  Ci -  c? +  4- Ê  c? -  2p Q
i= l i= l i= l i= l
simplifying further yields
P =
E Qi^l
n — 1
Thus, both methods give the same result for equilibrium price.
B ib) Solving the Aggregation Problem:
_  2 /  \  2 
n  =  E ’riW  =  ^ i ( ^ — ^ 1  - /  + ............+ HL
i= l V P
/
which implies
n.TT (c) =  —p2 '^ v +  E  Ci -  2p E! Ci
i= l i= l
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which is equal to 
-pL
n {P - c Ÿ  -  fy
Solving for c
n /  +  E  c - -  2p ^  Q
i = l  î= l
- n f
E c ?  E Q
n n
Solving for tt ( c)  :
7T (c) =  a: (c) m { c )  — f  
From the zero profit cutoff
7T (c*) =  X  (c*) m  (c*) — /  =  0
Using the ratios
' ( 2 ) =
This implies
7t { c )  =  f (  ü z i w  y _  j
\ p - c * { j p ) J
where both c and c* are the functions of equilibrium price p.
Blc) Effect of Market Size:
Number of entrepreneurs increases proportionately with market size,
(i) For the same average productivity
E ^  2  E  Ci
i= \ i= l
n  2 n
The effect of introducing a constant 1 in the denominator
2Y ,C i 2 E c j
Z=1 Z=1
2 (n — 1 ) 2 n — 1
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This implies
Pa >Pf
where ps is the price in the smaller and pi is the price in the larger market.
(ii) For a firm with a given productivity level Ci
P s — Q >  Pi — Ci
tha t is, firms operating in larger markets have smaller mark-ups. 
‘Toughness of competition’ effect of an increase in number of firms is a 
robust prediction of oligopoly models (Sutton, 1998).
(iii) O utput rises unambiguously.
Given the output function:
Xi{c) = /3L P - C ip2
Thus, direct effect of market size (L) on output of an individual firm is 
positive.
To compute the indirect effect through price, define
Its first order derivative
df(p) 1 Ci C i - p
is negative because Ci < p  (otherwise no firm would produce a positive 
output) and price p is strictly greater than zero. The sign of the derivative 
implies that in larger markets, as price is lower, outputs of individual firms 
are higher. Thus, both direct and indirect effects imply that firms in larger 
markets have unambiguously higher outputs.
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3.8.2 B 2 : Open Econom y w ith  FD I
B2a) Partitioning of Firms by Multinational Status:
Zero profit cutoff for domestic production in country j is:
'^ij (c) =  (c) (c) - f d  = 0
Rearranging this yields:
Cj =Pj 1 - ' A  
^ 4
Zero profit cutoff for foreign affiliate production in country j is: 
7r f , (c) =  x f , (c) (c) -  f j  = 0V ' ' ij  ^ ' ij
Rearranging this yields:
Cfj' -  Pj 1 - pLj
Given the assumption that
f i  > fd
9 /  < cj
i.e. multinational operators are more productive then domestic firms. 
This proves Proposition 1.
B2b) Solving for the Equilibrium Price (Open Economy with FDI): 
Again, there are two ways to  solve for the equilibrium price.
Method 1: Use goods market clearing and Walras’ Law:
In equilibrium, total demand for good X must equal its supply:
B L.
—  =  E ^ i W +
Pj i=l z=l
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Substituting out the output supply function
simplifying further
Pj = njPj +  n^ypj -  Ë  Q -  Ë  Q 
rearranging yields
£  Q +  £  Ci
P j  =  — ----------
Tlj  +  72yy — 1
Method 2: Using the labour market clearing condition and production 
technology
Lj Ljx “t“ Ljy
This is equal to
Lj — £  {fd +  Ci.Xi (c)) + £ ( / /  +  Ci.Xi (c)) +  ( 1  — /?) Lj -f Ilj
i=\ i= l
where
- n , U  + PL, E  ( ^ ) ' - « / / / ^
i = l  \  P j  /  i= l V P j  /
Substituting out the output supply function, the profit function and then 
cancelling out the fixed costs terms
i= l Pj i—1 Pj^
2
+  ( 1  -  /3) L, +  /?L, E  +  PL, E  ( ^ ) '
t= l V Pj J i= l V Pj /
Simplifying further yields
"j ”/ /
Pj =  £  Q {pj — Ci) +  £  Ci {pj — q )  +  £  {pj — Ci) +  £  {pj — CiY
i=l 1=1 z=l z=l
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Expanding the brackets, cancelling out common terms and rearranging 
yields
Z Q  +  £  Ci
Pj = nj +  n^y — 1
Thus, both methods give the same solution for equilibrium price. 
Repeat the same for the other market
£  Ci +  £  Q
p y  =
n y  - h U f j  - 1
B2c) Pro-competitive Effect of Inward FDI: 
Partitioning of firms by multinational status implies
Z  A Z  Q
i= l ^  2=1
rii Uf-'Lj , L j y
Adding the same term to the numerator and denominator on both sides
Z Ci + Z Ci Z Ci +  Z Ci
i= l i= l ^  i= l i= l
Subtracting 1 from denominator on both sides
Z Ci +  Z Ci Z Ci +  Z Ci
i= l i= l ^  i= l i= l
This implies
Tlj  Tlj  — \  ^ f j '  "P — I
2 ( Z Ci ) Z Ci + Z Ci
i= l /  ^  i= l i= l
2nj — 1 T l j y  Tlj — 1
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Further, since
/ "j \  / '"J \  fj "■]
2 I E Q I 2 I E Q I E Q + E Q
i = l  /  ^  \ t '= l  /  t i = l  *—1
2 tIj  —  2  2 7 i j  —  1  +  T lj —  1
and
It has been proved that
T l j  /  U j  \
Ê c i  2 f E Q )
i=l _  \i=l J
Tlj  — 1 2?Tj — 2
E  Ci Ë  Ci +  É  Ci
In other words,
i= l ^  i—1 i—1
Tlj  — 1 Tlyj' -t- Tlj  — 1
Pj > P ;
i.e. equilibrium price under autarky is higher than equilibrium price under 
open economy with FDI.
Moreover, from equation 98, the zero-profit cutoff cost (productivity) also 
falls
c ; < c -
This may cause the exit of least productive domestic firms. In case it 
happens, it further lowers the average marginal cost of domestic firms — -, 
thereby further lowering the equilibrium price from the expression above.
These results were described in Proposition 2 as "pro-competitive" effects 
of inward FDI.
B2d) Business Stealing Effect of Inward FDI:
Proposition 3 flows from proposition 2.
Output function for an individual firm can be written as
^ü(c) =
Pj
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1 -  —  
Pj.
Fall in equilibrium price implies the term inside the bracket as well as the 
term outside the bracket on the right hand side decline implying an decrease 
in the output and market share of domestic firms, as the economy in opened 
up to FDI.
Similarly, profit function can be written as
1 -  —  
Pj\
fd
Fall in equilibrium price also implies a fall in firm profits.
In other words, inward FDI has a "business stealing" effect on domestic 
firms, by causing exit of least productive domestic producers and by stealing 
market shares and shifting profits away from firms that continue to operate 
in the domestic economy.
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3.8.3 B 3 : Proxim ity-C oncentration Trade-off
B3a) Relationship between the Three Cost Cutoffs:
From the zero-cutoff profit conditions for domestic and foreign affiliate 
production we get
( ^ } j )  i ^ f j )  f i
4  (4) (4) f ‘‘
which imphes
Rearranging yields
Therefore,
Pj -  Pj
C f j  -  P j
Similarly, relationship between export and domestic productivity cutoff can 
be derived as follows:
Pj -  'Tclj ^
‘ U
P j - P j \  ~r =  -  c
This leaves the relationship between foreign investment productivity cutoff 
and export productivity cutoff, which is derived as follows:
Pi -  9 ;  
Pj - X J
Pj - P j \  r r  -  ^fj r C x j i l  —
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C/j — P j 1 -
B3b) Partitioning between Trade and FDI:
Proposition 5: The sufficient condition for partitioning of exporting firms 
by FDI status is
4 ;  <
At cXJ
/3L,
(pj -  - r c ijT = /»
This implies
%  =  -
A
/3Lj
At cfj
This implies
/?Lj
Pi
Ct - =
{pj -  ^ f jT  = f i
P. 1 - J l(3L,
For the sufficient condition to be satisfied
Pi 1 - A(3L,
1
<  -  
T Pi 1 -
A
/3L,
Rearranging yields:
/ /  > (^VTx H —
Hence proved.
B3c) Proof of Proposition 6: Writing out the output functions:
4  (c) =  ^  b  -  <=]
Pj
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3Absence of (variable) trade costs implies
3::^  (c) > (c)
and
(c) > m?. (c)
Multiplying both sides of the above two equations yields
(c) (c) > a;?, (c) m?. (c)
Given a level of fixed costs satisfying Proposition 5 above, at the threshold 
cost (productivity) cut-off between exporting and FDI
(^h) ^  (^/j)
which implies
4  (4 ;)  -  A  =  4  (4 ; )  ( 4 ;)  "
But since fixed costs don’t increase with output and given that profit is a
quadratic function of variable costs, for the firms with productivity above 
this cut-off threshold:
z /  (c) m / (c) -  / /  > T? (c) m?. (c) -
which implies
(c) > TT? (c)
Hence proved.
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3.8.4 B 4 : F D I R egim es and W elfare
B4a) Proof of Proposition 7: Only country 1 permits FDI.
This has a pro-competitive effect on the host economy given by
AW^(u) = k(p:^ - P i f )  Li 
There is also a business stealing effect,
because of loss of market shares of domestic producers, given by: 
I  A 4  (c) =  n ,A 4  (c) =  n,/3L, ( ( l  -  ^ )  ~  ~  j )  )
But since the national government of country 1 can implement an inde­
pendent FDI Policy Ai, it can retain a part of the profits country 2 multi­
national firms earn abroad by operating affiliates in country 1. This is given 
by:
"/j , ,
(1 -  Ai) ^  ATT , (c) =  (1 -  Ai) rifjiTT , (c) =  (1 -  Ai)
i = i  J-' J^
-  \  2
prf2ri2pLi  ^1 -
Country 1 is welfare neutral, when the retained multinational profits and 
the pro-competitive effect are large enough to offset the total loss of profit 
revenues by the domestic firms. This implies:
E  Avr^ (c) =  (1 -  Ai) 5^ AyrL (c) +  k )  Li
2=1 2=1 \ /
By rearranging and substitution:
TijATT^  (c) -  k -  p ~^) Li
(1 -  Ai) =
((i - - (i - 1)') - {pi^-PTf)
prf2n2lS (l -
87
B4b) Proof of Proposition 8:
Now suppose country 2’s central planner also permits FDI and it is regu­
lated by a given policy regime Ag. In this case, country I ’s multinational firms 
also earn profit rents abroad by operating affiliates in country 2. Country 1 
would now be welfare neutral when:
Ttj / \
E ^'^ij (c) = (1 -  Ai) E (c) + k -  PÏ^ ) 1^ + A2 E (c)
i = l  iz=l ■' \
By rearranging and substitution (in the same way as proof for Proposition 7 
above) we get:
niA7rf (c) -  k )  Li -  \ 2prfiniTv{ (c)
1 ^ ---------------------------------- T7^\------------------------PTf2n2T^2 (c)
B4c) For Case 3b (Section 3.6.2): The best the two countries can do to­
gether is to share the total multinational profits through suitable FDI policies 
in such a way tha t gap between the business stealing and pro-competitive 
effects of inward FDI is fully covered within each country. This imphes for 
country 1:
k (p^^ -  p ^ f  )  ~  n iA irf (c) -j- A2.pr/ini7rf (c) +  (1 -  \ i )p r f2ri2'ÏÏ2 (c) =  0
and for country 2:
k (p2 ^ -  P2/ )  L 2 -  n2A7T2 ( c )  +  \ i .p r f2U2'K2 (c) +  (1 -  A2)pr'/ini7r( (c) =  0
Rearranging the first of these equations yields the following reaction func­
tion for country 1:
p ri2n2v i  (c) + k { p /  -  P i f )  Li -  n,A7rf (c) p r f^ n M  (c)
prf2n27T^ (c) p rf2ri2'ïï{ (c)
and rearranging the second equation yields a similar reaction function for 
country 2:
prymiTrf (c) +  A:  ^ 7,2 -  712Avrg (c) pr/27i27r^  (c)
pr/ini7r( (c) prfi'ni'K{ (c)
The two reaction functions are positively sloping in (Ai, A2) space. They 
have equal slopes given by:
AAg _  p rf2ri2Tv{ (c)
AAi prfiniTv( (c)
Now, the hypothesis is tha t the two country’s reaction functions overlap. 
The welfare equations for the two countries be rearranged as follows:
^ (P i^  -  P i f )  T i-n iA 7rf (c)+pr/2n27r( (c) =  pr/snzTr^ (c) A i-pr/injTrf (c) A2
- [ ^  (p2  ^ -  P2f )  J-2-n2^7T2 (c)+prfini7r{ (c)] =  prf2n27r{ (c) A i-p r/in i7 r( (c) A;
The right hand side of the two equations are equal.
If the two equations were to overlap in (Ai, A2 ) space, their left hand sides 
should be equal as well, that is:
^ (p7^ -  Pia )  -  ni Att? (c) +  p rf2n 2Tri (c)
=  - [ k  (p2^ -  P2a )  ^2 -  n2Att^ (c) +  pT/iniTrf (c)] 
which is equal to
[n iA nf (c) +  712 Att^ (c)] -  )  Li +  /c (p2^ -  )  L2]
=  prfini7r( (c) +  pvf27127^ 2 (c)
But this is actually true, since all it is saying is that gap between pro- 
competitive and business stealing effects of inward FDI for both countries 
together must be fully covered by total multinational profits, which is the 
starting assumption behind Case 3b. Hence, our hypothesis tha t the two 
functions overlap in (Ai, A2) space is true, because the reaction functions are 
simply the rearranged welfare equations for the two countries given above.
The implication is that we do not have a unique Nash equilibrium, but 
infinitely many solutions which constitute multiple Nash equilibria tha t are 
Pareto equivalent. This is shown in the graph below:
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X
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Figure 3 .2 : Graphs for the two reaction functions Aj(A2) =  A2(Ai): Case 3b
A similar exercise can now be repeated for the Case 3c. Let the welfare 
surplus generated by total multinational profits be denoted by Q .
n = ( p f - pTf) i, + k ( p f  -  -
[uiAtTj (c) +  (c)] +  p r /in i7 r (  (c) +  Wf 2n2T^2 (c)
W ith equal bargaining power, this surplus is equally divided between the 
two countries.
The welfare equations for the two countries now are:
A: -  niATrf (c) +  \ 2Vrf\ni'ïï{ (c) +  (1 -  Ai)pr/27%27r^ (c) =  H /2
and
A- (p-2  ^ -  P 2 a  )  ^ 2  -  MgATTg (c) +  Aipr/2n27r.{ (c) +  (1 -  A2)7>r/ini7r( (c) =  H/2  
Rearranging these yields the two reaction functions:
9Ü
_  Prf2ri2'ïïi (c) +  A: ( p /  -  p J )  -  n i A t t ?  ( c )  -  0 / 2  (c)
(^2)  ------------------------------------- J — ---------------------------+ -----------/i= r
p rf2ri2Tvi (c) p rf2n2T^2 (4
and
^ (p2^ -  P2<f )  -£-2 -  MaATrg (c) -  (c)
pr;ini7r{ (c) p r fin iv {  (c)
Again the two equations are positively sloping in (Ai, A2) space and have 
equal slopes given by:
AA2 _  prf2n27r^ (c)
AAi prfini7r{ (c)
Moreover, it can be shown in the same way as in Case 3b, that they 
overlap each other.
Again the hypothesis is that the two country’s reaction functions overlap.
The welfare equations for the two countries can be rearranged as follows:
k ^pj^ -  p^f'j L i- tiiA tti (c)+prf2n27r{ ( c ) -0 /2  =  p rf2Ti2'K2 M  A i-pr/in i7r( (c) A2
-[A; (p2 ^ -  P2a )  L 2- r i2ATvi (c)+pr/iMi7r{ (c )-0 /2 ]  =  p r f2U2T^ { (c) A i-pr/ini7r{ (c) A2
The right hand side of the two equations are equal.
If the two equations were to overlap in (Ai, A2) space their left hand sides 
should be equal as well, that is:
A; (^PÏ^ -  P ïf^  Li -  niATrf (c) +  pr/2n27r{ (c) -  H/2
=  -  [  ^ (p2  ^ -  P2a )  ^ 2  -  n2A7T2 (c) +  pr/iHiTrf (c) -  Ü/2]
which is equal to
[ n i A t t ?  ( c )  +  r i2A t t^  ( c ) ]  -  j^ A: ^ -  p J )  L i  +  A: ( p 2 ^ -  P g f  )  T 5
=  prfini7r( (c) +  pr/2n27T^ (c)
-j- ri
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But this is true, since all it is saying is that total multinational prof­
its generate a welfare surplus H after taking care of the potentially welfare 
decreasing effect of inward FDI represented by the excess of business steal­
ing effect over the pro-competitive effect, which is the starting assumption 
behind Case 3c. Hence, our hypothesis that the two functions overlap in 
(Ai, A2) space is true as reaction functions are simply the rearranged welfare 
equations for the two countries given above. Again, this implies, we do not 
have a unique Nash equilibrium, but infinitely many solutions constituting 
the multiple Nash equilibria that are Pareto equivalent.
Graphs for the reaction functions in Case 3c is shown in Figure 3.3 below. 
Compare with the Figure 3.2 above. Notice that reaction functions in both 
Case 3b and Case 3c have the same slope, but different intercepts. Reaction 
functions in Case 3b pass through the origin, meaning thereby that autarky 
is also a Nash Equilibrium in Case 3b (but not in Case 3c).
1
Case 3c
X
X
X
Figure 3.3; Graphs for the two reaction functions A*(A2) =  A2 (Ai): Case 3c
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4  P ro d u c tiv ity  and F oreign In vestm en t P o licy  : E v i­
d en ce  from  Indian  L ib eralisation
4.1 In trod u ction
National governments implement a variety of FDI policies with the purported 
aim of gaining from foreign investment like technology spillovers, capital for­
mation, employment generation, creation of incentives for investment in basic 
infrastructure, for investment in skilled/higher education etc. W ith capital 
becoming more freely mobile across borders, one of the principal attractions 
of foreign direct investment remains inflow of advanced technology and/or 
efficient management practices from foreign to domestic firms. At the same 
time, entering foreign firms compete out domestic firms by causing exit of 
least productive firms and by stealing market shares from the erstwhile op­
erating firms. Which of these effects will dominate has implications for the 
framing of FDI policies in the host economy. No wonder, FDI liberalisation 
has been at least as heatedly debated as trade liberalisation amongst policy 
makers the world over.
Empirical evidence on whether FDI liberalisation increases firm level ef­
ficiency is mixed. Multinational firms may, in principle, have both positive 
and negative effects on local firms, where likelihood of a positive effect de­
pends on the size of technology gap and the extent of vertical linkage between 
the foreign and the domestic firms (Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Aitken 
and Harrison (1999) studied productivity effects of inward FDI on a sample 
of Venezuelan manufacturing plants from 1976-1989. They found a positive 
relationship between increased foreign equity participation and plant level 
performance, but domestic firms in sectors with high FDI actually recorded 
lower productivity levels. If they drop inputs as independent variables, the 
industry level FDI reduces the output of domestic firms and they conclude, 
this is the channel through which the negative effect of FDI on measured pro­
ductivity of domestic firms operates. Javorcik (2004) investigated the same 
hypothesis on a sample of manufacturing plants in Lithuania from 1996-2000 
and found that positive spillovers from FDI were more likely to be vertical 
rather than horizontal in nature. This is because, for horizontally competing 
firms, business stealing effect of foreign investment is stronger than the tech­
nology transfer effect on measured productivity of domestic firms; whereas 
for domestic firms, which provide intermediate inputs to foreign affiliates, 
technology transfer effect predominates as increase in demand goes hand in
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hand with foreign affiliates privately benefiting from increased productiv­
ity of their suppliers. Contrast this with the studies of UK firms like Haskel, 
Pereira and Slaughter (2007) or Griffith, Redding and Simpson (2003), which 
find evidence of positive horizontal FDI spillovers for a sample of manufac­
turing plants in the UK. To summarize, technological proximity is the key 
determinant of MNE’s spillovers to local firms and firms in developed coun­
tries are better placed to  benefit from horizontal technology spillovers than 
similarly placed firms in developing countries.
India’s 1991 liberalisation offers a unique opportunity. Ostensibly a re­
sponse to balance of payment crisis, it was a tectonic policy shift, centrally 
managed and triggered by the IMF structural adjustment programme. So 
rapid and unexpected was this policy intervention and the events that un­
folded after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, tha t it is reasonable to assume 
that firms could not have acted in anticipation of these reforms.
Trade liberalisation, industrial delicensing and foreign investment liber­
alisation were the three main pillars of this fairly comprehensive package of 
structural reforms. Since these reforms were not uniform across industries 
and time, I will use the industry-time variation to identify effects of change in 
foreign investment policy on firm level performance controlling for industrial 
delicensing and trade reforms. This issue is of immense policy importance 
given the fact that having built a broad consensus for economic reform, FDI 
liberalisation still excites passionate and acrimonious debates in the Indian 
polity; and that these in recent times have gone to the extent of threatening 
the very survival of party in power.
Krishna and M itra (1998) investigated the effects of trade liberalisation 
in India on market discipline and productivity growth. They found Indian 
liberalisation, as a whole, had a pro-competitive effect on manufacturing 
firms in four industry sectors along with a weaker effect on productivity 
growth. Balakrishnan, Pushpangadan and Babu (2000) and Topalova (2004) 
analysed productivity effects of trade liberalisation using a firm-year panel 
of Indian manufacturing industries. While Balakrishnan et al used a shorter 
post-liberalisation period (till 1997) and did not find any significant produc­
tivity effect of trade liberalisation, Topalova used a longer post-liberalisation 
firm panel and found a positive productivity effect for trade liberalisation. 
Kathuria (2000) studied productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms 
in a panel of 368 Indian firms between 1976-89 and found that spillovers from 
foreign to domestic firms were positive only if the domestic firms invested a
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significant amount in R&D activities.^®
Now, a few words on the measures of productivity. The simplest measures 
of productivity are measures of labour productivity, like value added per 
employee, output per employee etc. But their drawback is that they are 
affected by the use of other factors of production (like capital and materials), 
which are not taken into account. A standard way of taking into account 
the effect of all factors of production is to  estimate multi-factor productivity, 
also called the T FP  or Total Factor Productivity. This involves estimation 
of a Hicks neutral productivity shift parameter. The simplest way to do this 
is to estimate production function in a log linear form using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). In recent times, as firm level panel data sets have become 
more widely available, better and more consistent methods have evolved, for 
example, the Blundell-Bond method, which uses a System GMM Estimator 
or the Olley-Pakes method, which allows for endogeneity of inputs (capital), 
selection (exit) and (quasi) permanent differences across firms. Levinsohn- 
Petrin is a variant of the Olley-Pakes method, which allows for the use of 
inputs like materials or energy to solve the endogeneity problem.^^ This 
makes Levinsohn-Petrin method easier to use with the balance sheet data 
and though computationally involved, it produces robust estimates of the 
production function. Many recent works like Fernandes (2003), Topalova 
(2004), Blalock and Gertler (2004), Alvarez and Lopez (2005) etc. have used 
this technique.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the foreign investment 
policy in India. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy along with the data 
sets used. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
4.2  Foreign In vestm en t P olicy: th e  Ind ian  C ase
After Independence, India opted for a mixed economy. This basically meant 
a market economy, where the State and the private sector would coexist, 
but the State would occupy the ‘commanding heights’. In the name of a 
‘socialistic pattern of society’, this led to an extensive system of licences and 
regulatory controls, commonly called the ‘license ra j’. The philosophy of this 
era is outlined in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948, which reserved a
"^^ This increases their proximity to the technology frontier.
Compare this with the Olley-Pakes method, which uses investment as a proxy to solve 
this problem.
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sphere for the private sector and a sphere for the public sector. The foreign 
investment philosophy of the times is summed up by the following words:
"that os a rule, the major interest in ownership and effective control 
should always be in the Indian hands. In all cases, however, the training 
of suitable Indian personnel for the purpose of eventually replacing the for­
eign experts will be insisted upon. "
Thus began a prolonged era of import substitution, where foreign capital 
was looked upon with suspicion.
After India became a republic, the Industries Development and Regula­
tion (IDRA) Act of 1951 was promulgated to give effect to this philosophy, 
and the Industrial policy resolution of 1956 continued the same attitude to ­
wards foreign capital.
Alongside all this, a complex legal and institutional framework was evolved 
under the Foreign Exchange Regulation (FERA) Act and the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTF) Act to  ensure a marginal and highly 
circumscribed role for foreign investment in the economy. FERA restricted 
foreign equity participation to 40 percent, ostensibly to restrict outflow of for­
eign exchange arising from dividend and royalty payments. The ideological 
bias was clearly against ‘foreign’ control and in favour of ‘self reliance’.
The political upheavals of the mid 1970’s brought the Janata  Party Gov­
ernment to power in 1977. They promulgated the Industrial Policy Resolu­
tion of 1977. Approach to foreign capital, however, remained the same and 
the obsession with self reliance continued. This is evident from the following 
statement in this policy resolution:
"In case where foreign technological know-how is not needed, existing col­
laborations will not be renewed. As a rule, majority interest in ownership and 
effective control should be in Indian hands though the Government may make 
exceptions in highly export-oriented and/or sophisticated technology areas. "
W ithin three years, the Congress Party was back in power and it brought 
back its own Industrial Policy Resolution. There was minor liberalisation in 
the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1980, whereby 100% export oriented units 
and a few high priority industries were exempted from 40% foreign equity 
restrictions and licensing procedures for MRTP companies were simplified, 
but the structure of regulatory controls, by and large, remained intact and 
the inflow of foreign investment remained minuscule.
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Rajiv Gandhi came to power in 1984 with the vision of modernising In- 
dia.^^ The period between 1985-90 was a period of attitudinal change. It 
was a period of slow liberalisation within the framework of existing laws. 
Although the importance of foreign capital and technology in industrial de­
velopment was recognized (especially in the computer and information tech­
nology industries), the emphasis on self reliance continued. Even though no 
new Industrial Policy was formulated, it was clearly felt that public sector 
had spread into "too many areas where it should not be The driving philos­
ophy of this period was to expand the role of the "domestic private sector". 
In the words of Mr Rajiv Gandhi himself:
"We will develop our public sector to do undertake jobs the private sector 
cannot do. But we will be opening up more to the private sector so that it 
can expand and the economy can grow more freely. "
Regulations and controls on private enterprise under the IDRA and MRTP 
Acts were eased. Some industries, hitherto subject to compulsory licensing, 
were delicensed. As energy pent up in the private Indian enterprise was un­
leashed, GDP began to grow faster. But the biggest contribution this era 
made was to the mood of the Indian nation and to  the attitude of its polity, 
which set the platform for major policy reforms ahead.
While it is true that late 1980’s are known for mini-hberalisation, they 
also became known for fiscal indiscipline and a deteriorating current account. 
After the assassination of Mr Rajiv Gandhi, and the brief political turmoil 
tha t followed, a reformist Congress Government came to power in early 1991. 
Undertaken as part of an IMF structural adjustment programme, the ‘Lib­
eralisation Revolution’ that followed dwarfed anything of its kind seen on 
the Indian landscape so far. Taking advantage of the balance of payment 
crisis, it first shook the external sector by undertaking major devaluation 
of currency, made the rupee convertible on current account and replaced 
the import control order with a foreign trade development and regulation 
ordinance. This was followed by sustained structural reforms, which have 
continued with industry-time variation till date. The three major compo­
nents of these structural reforms are discussed below:
Firstly, all industries were delicensed except a small list reserved for the 
public sector (defence, atomic energy, railways and minerals) and a list of 
eighteen industries called the Schedule II industries for which compulsory
"He was an airline pilot who came to power after his mother’s assassination!
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licensing was retained under the provisions of Industries Development and 
Regulation Act,1951. This hst of industries reserved for compulsory licensing 
was progressively reduced over the next decade.
Secondly, tariff barriers were significantly reduced over the 1990’s. Aux­
iliary and additional duties were abolished and the overall trade regime was 
progressively simplified to bring it in conformity with the WTO framework.
Thirdly, a major shake-up of foreign investment policy was announced 
through a series of policy resolutions/notifications between July, 1991 and 
July, 1992. The most significant of these changes was to permit majority 
foreign ownership (i.e. 51 percent foreign equity) in 52 out of 100 four-digit 
manufacturing industries, even if they were not 100 percent export oriented 
units. This, for the first time since independence, sent powerful signals to 
foreign investors that no m atter what changes occurred in the Indian polity, 
their ownership control over the foreign affiliate will not be taken away. An­
other particularly interesting feature of this policy was that, in the same 
industries in which majority foreign ownership was allowed, domestic firms 
were allowed an ‘automatic approval’^  ^ if they wanted to enter into a for­
eign technology agreement or collaboration abroad. This meant tha t Indian 
firms wanting to upgrade their technology and enter into a foreign technol­
ogy collaboration simply had to submit an application to the Secretariat of 
Industrial Approvals, Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion and the 
only scrutiny the Government would do is to see that their manufacturing 
item belongs to the list of liberalised foreign investment industries. If yes, 
a copy of the approval would be sent to the Reserve Bank of India and this 
will ensure they get the promised foreign exchange on priority basis.^^ It 
was not mere coincidence, but part of a conscious strategy, that these two 
elements of the foreign investment regime were implemented together, by 
the same sub-department of the Government and through the same policy 
resolutions/notifications. And because these two elements of the foreign in-
Automatic approval of foreign technology agreement/ collaboration (FTA) should not 
be confused with ‘automatic route’ for both foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign 
technology approval (FTA). The automatic route meant that subject to certain limitations, 
applications for FDI and FTA could be submitted directly to the Reserve Bank of India 
(India’s Central Bank) rather than to the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (an inter- 
ministerial group within the Government).
*In the Indian setup, where Government never introduced capital account convertibility 
and retained tight capital controls, this was a strong inducement to domestic firms to 
update their technology and modernize as their respective industry sectors were opened 
to foreign investment and competition.
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vestment policy were so closely related, unless otherwise stated, FDI policy 
variable here will be used in the generic sense, th a t is, it will include both 
foreign direct investment and foreign technology agreement. I will, later in 
the paper, take the case of motorcar industry and try  to distinguish between 
these two using an alternate strategy.
To summarize, from the erstwhile position of a supreme regulator the 
Government of India became a facilitator of foreign direct investment as well 
as the adoption of foreign technology by domestic firms. Out of a total of 
26,531 approvals granted by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India between Aug, 1991 
and January, 2005 18,867 were ‘foreign direct investment’ approvals for for­
eign firms and 7,664 were ‘foreign technology approvals’ for domestically 
operating firms. Moreover, industries which attracted high foreign direct in­
vestment were also the industries in which foreign technology approvals for 
domestically operating firms was high.
Till very recently, Indian policy makers have resisted the temptation of 
offering outright subsidies to foreign investors (popularly called ‘incentive 
competition’) as has been in vogue in South-East and East Asia. The Indian 
psyche, in this regard, has been to support domestic industry, while at the 
same time open up these industry sectors to  foreign direct investment. The 
aim of this paper is to investigate, what effect, if any, this policy had on the 
productivity of manufacturing firms.
4 .3  D a ta , M eth o d o lo g y  and E stim a tio n  S tra teg y
The firm level database was obtained from the Centre for Monitoring Indian 
Economy (henceforth CMIE). It is called ‘Prowess’ and contains information 
compiled from the balance sheet and income-expenditure statements of nearly 
10,000 large and medium-sized Indian firms.^^ This includes firms listed on 
the Indian stock exchange as well as others submitting their financial reports 
to the Registrar for Companies in India.
The number of manufacturing firms represented in this database is about 
4900. Distribution of these firms by year and ownership is summarized in Ta­
ble 4.1. The database starts with 1090 manufacturing firms in 1989, steadily
These firms account for 75 percent of corporate taxes and over 90 percent of excise 
duties collected in India.
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increasing up to 3302 in 1995 and then fluctuating around the same level till 
2004. The exit rates are low (one to flve percent per year), possibly because 
of the rigidity of bankruptcy laws in India (see Topalova, 2004). The time 
line for this study is 1989 to 2004 and the aim is to analyse the productiv­
ity effects of foreign investment liberalisation over and above the effects of 
industrial delicensing and trade reforms.
Firms were classified by their economic activity into 4-digit industries 
as per the 1998 version of the National Industries Classification for India 
(henceforth called NIC-98). The nominal variables were deflated and capi­
tal revalued at replacement costs using the perpetual inventory method as 
described in Appendix C2.
Industrial delicensing details were compiled from the notifications issued 
by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, Government of India. Industrial delicensing dummy equals one 
if the industry is delicensed (from the year of delicensing onwards), and 0 
otherwise. Delicensing variable thus varies across time and industries.
Import tariff barriers were compiled from the Custom Tariff Manuals, 
Government of India. Many earlier studies have used only the basic tariff. 
Since it underestimates the height of tariff barriers, I use basic, additional 
and countervailing duties in accordance with the formula described in Ap­
pendix C3.^® I developed an improved electronic version of the mapping 
between harmonised system (hs) of product classification and National In­
dustries Classification (NIC) for India, the earlier attem pt being made by 
Debroy and Santhanam (1993).
Foreign Investment Policy was laid out by a series of statutory resolu­
tions, official notifications/ press notes issued by Department of Industrial 
Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of 
India from time to time. Foreign Investment Liberalisation was an important 
element of structural reforms in the year between 1991 and 1992. The policy 
resolution issued at that time stated as follows;
" in view of the advancement in India’s industrial economy, the relation­
ship between domestic and foreign industry needs to be much more dynamic 
than it has been in the past, in terms of both technology and investment."
Thus, while admitting tha t foreign investment policy has been restrictive 
in the past, the FDI liberalisation was effected as follows:
"In order to invite foreign investment in high priority industries, requir-
’The same formulation was used by Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2006).
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ing large investments and advanced technology, it has been decided to provide 
approval for direct foreign investment up to 51 percent foreign equity in such 
industries. There shall be no bottlenecks o f any kind in this process. This 
group of industries has generally been knoum as the Appendix-1 Industries 
and are areas in which FERA companies are also allowed to invest on dis­
cretionary basis. "
And simultaneously to  encourage adoption of foreign technology by do­
mestic firms it was decided that:
" With a view to injecting the desired level of technological dynamism in the 
industry Government will provide automatic approval fo r technology agree­
ments related to high priority industries within specified parameters. "
As stated in this policy resolution, technology and investment were seen 
as two essential components of the foreign investment liberalisation. Which 
industries were to be subject to this treatment was determined by the per­
ception of policy makers regarding requirements of large investments and 
advanced technology. These changes were brought about so quickly that 
the administrative department in Government of India did not even have the 
time undertake a formal study or constitute a High Level Committee to delve 
into relevant issues as a precursor to these d e c is io n .T h is  permitted little 
time for lobbying, which may be a virtue as far as this analysis in concerned. 
Subsequent reform, by and large, increased the permitted level of foreign eq­
uity or further simplified investment procedures, while extending the foreign 
investment liberalisation to service sector industries.
Although 51 percent foreign equity was prominently mentioned in this 
policy resolution, the liberalisation had as much to  do with procedural re­
forms and relaxation of foreign exchange controls as with foreign equity, 
and that foreign technology agreements (FTA) and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) were its integral parts. Thus, here, the FDI policy is denoted by a 
generic foreign investment policy variable, which is 1 if the manufacturing 
industry was subject to foreign investment liberalisation (from the year of 
liberalisation onwards), and 0 otherwise.
I also explored alternative measures of FDI. Amount of FDI inflow suffers 
from the drawback that it is not related to management ownership, and can
^^The standard practice in Government of India has been to constitute a High Level 
Committee, whenever a major policy reform is contemplated. Such a committee then 
studies the issue in details and submits its recommendations before the major policy 
reform is implemented. In this case, the speed of the reform and exigencies of the time 
precluded policy makers from undertaking such an exercise.
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also be misleading because, what proportion of capital should a firm mobilise 
across the border is an endogenous decision of the firm (Lipsey et al). Ratio 
of foreign to total number of operating firms or foreign to local sales cannot 
be used, because the Prowess database includes only large and medium firms, 
not the smaller firms operating in tha t industry.
As already mentioned, I include in this study, the three main pillars of 
structural policy reforms implemented in India during the 1990’s. Following 
existing literature (Topalova, 2004 and others) all policy variables are effected 
in the year following the one in which the respective announcement is made.
The analysis is done in two stages. In the first stage. Total Factor Pro­
ductivity (TFP) if computed using two alternative methods. Then in the 
second stage, measured productivity is related to changes in sectoral policy.
T FP  is first estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) as the Hicks 
neutral productivity parameter of a log linearized Cobb-Douglas production 
function of the form:
Y  = (138)
where Y  represents total output as a function of the total factor produc­
tivity (A), capital input (A), labour input (L), material input (M ), energy 
input {E) and the respective input shares /3j, and (3^ . All variables
are real and capital is expressed in terms of its replacement cost. T FP  is the 
difference between the actual and predicted output.
Since estimates obtained by ordinary least squares can be biased by cor­
relation between choice of firm inputs and unobserved firm level produc­
tivity shocks, I further obtain consistent estimates of TFP using a semi- 
parametric estimation technique developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
This method uses intermediate inputs as a proxy to correct for simultane­
ity in firms’ production function.^^ The first step in this method uses the 
following estimation equation:
Vit — PiHt 3- P2'^it +  PsHt +  P4^t +  +  4t (139)
where y denotes log output, k denotes log capital, I denotes log labour, 
m  denotes log material, e denotes log energy (power & fuel) for a firm i in 
industry j over time t, Ua is the firm specific time varying productivity shock 
that is potentially observed by firms before making their input decisions at
■^ *^ 011ey-Pakes uses investment. This is not always readily available. Moreover, the firms 
may not invest every time period as the investment tends to be ‘lumpy’.
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time t  (i.e. correlated with firm’s choice of inputs) and ea is the productivity 
shock that is not observed or predictable by firms before making their input 
decisions at time t (i.e. uncorrelated with firm’s choice of inputs). Details of 
this multi-step estimation procedure are given in Appendix C l.
Since production function is estimated for firms in each industry sepa­
rately, to make the estimated multi-factor productivity comparable across 
industries a productivity index is calculated. This is the logarithmic devi­
ation of firm’s productivity from the median productivity for tha t industry 
in the base year (taken here as 1991, the year in which liberalisation process 
was initiated).
The next stage in this analysis is to relate foreign investment policy to pro­
ductivity using productivity estimates from stage one. As already explained, 
foreign investment liberalisation in India came as a package amongst a host 
of structural reforms under the liberalisation ‘revolution’ of the 1990’s. To 
isolate the effect of foreign investment policy on productivity, I explicitly 
control for industrial delicensing and tariff reforms along with relevant firm 
characteristics like age, age-squared, ownership, firm size etc. The baseline 
econometric specification is as follows:
p r j  =  o: +  /3for{ 'yX - j - T t f i  + i4t (140)
Here, pr  is the productivity index for firm i in industry j at time t and 
f o r  is the foreign investment policy variable as explained above. X  is the 
matrix of control variables containing age of the firm, squared age of the firm, 
ownership characteristics (dummy), firm size category (dummy), industrial 
delicensing (dummy) and import tariffs (continuous variable), r* is the year 
dummy and fi  are the firm’s fixed effects. It is an unbalanced panel for year 
(time) and firm (id). To decide whether fixed or random effects model is 
more appropriate in this framework, I conduct the Hausman Specification 
Tests, results for which are explained in the section below.
4 .4  R esu lts  and D iscu ssion
4.4.1 P ro d u c tiv ity  Index
The productivity index is not the absolute value of multi-factor productivity, 
but logarithmic deviation from the median productivity for that industry in
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the base year (1991). The purpose of productivity index has already been ex­
plained. When average productivity index, computed for all manufacturing 
industries as a whole, is plotted against time (years), the graphs are as con­
tained in Figure 4.2 and 4.3. These plots of productivity, although obtained 
through different techniques (ordinary least squares and Levinsohn-Petrin), 
are remarkably similar in appearance.
These graphs indicate two waves of increase in productivity. In April, 1991 
general elections were held and a reformist Congress government came to 
power. As already mentioned, it unleashed on India’s economic horizon the 
most comprehensive structural reforms ever. This government remained in 
power till 1996, and as evident from the graphs, manufacturing firms’ perfor­
mance improved steadily. Mid-1996 to  Mid-1999 was the period of political 
instability, with shaky coalition governments in Delhi and as many as three 
mid-term elections were held. In this period, the reform process slowed down, 
and we find from the graphs, the manufacturing firms’ performance more or 
less fluctuated around the same level. After general elections inl999, again 
a pro-reformist and stable B JP Government came to power in D e l h i . I t  
continued in office till 2004 providing an investor friendly environment and 
surely, we see the effect in the graphs in the form of improving performance 
of manufacturing firms till 2004. Thus, it is important that if we want to 
investigate the impact of foreign investment policy on measured productivity 
of manufacturing firms, we must control for the time-specific macro shocks 
as I will do in this case.
In Table 4.2, I compare the production function estimates obtained from 
Ordinary Least Squares (ols) with those obtained using the Levinsohn-Petrin 
(levpet) technique. The coefficients are estimated at the level of 4-digit indus­
tries. The coefficients for labour and materials are more or less similar with 
mean values of 0.24 and 0.60 respectively and a similar pattern across indus­
tries. The OLS estimated coefficients for capital (mean value 0.08) are smaller 
than similar estimates obtained using the Levinsohn-Petrin technique (0.15) 
and the two sets of estimates show less correlation across industries. Largely 
because of the differences in estimation of capital coefficients, returns to scale 
estimates from OLS (mean value 1.001) are smaller than those obtained us­
ing the Levinsohn-Petrin technique (mean value 1.211). This difference is 
the effect of correction for simultaneity in firm’s production function.
Indian National Congress (INC) and Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) are the two main 
political parties in India.
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4.4.2 FD I P olicy  and P roductivity
The productivity index is regressed on foreign investment policy variable 
controlling for industrial delicensing, tariff liberalisation and firm character­
istics namely age, age-squared, ownership (private domestic, private foreign, 
public enterprises, joint and cooperative sectors), firm size (three categories 
by 50th and 90th percentile of real sales); time dummies (to control for time 
variant macro-shocks) and firm fixed effects (to control for time invariant 
firm specific heterogeneity) using the baseline specification in equation 140 
above. The time span for this data is 1989-2004. I first do the Hausman 
Specification Tests (see Table 4.3), which reject the random effects model in 
favour of the fixed effects model. Hence, only the results of fixed effects model 
are reported here in Table 4.4. Ownership and firm size category dummies 
are dropped in the fixed efiFects model.
Columns (1) and (2) are the regressions where productivity is estimated 
using the preferred Levinsohn-Petrin technique. For comparison, I run simi­
lar regressions in columns (3) and (4) for productivity estimates obtained by 
the ordinary least squares.
Since micro-data is combined with policy variables at the aggregate (in­
dustry) level, greater care is needed with the treatment of the variance- 
covariance matrix (Moulton, 1990). To ensure tha t standard error estimates 
for coefficients of policy variables are reliable, I cluster them at the level of 
4-digit (nic98 classification) industries and correct them for heteroskedastic- 
ity. As a robustness check, I also report an alternative set of bootstrapped 
standard errors.
Coefficients for the foreign investment policy variable are positive and 
significant implying that liberalised foreign investment sectors have experi­
enced a significantly greater increase (an additional 7 percent) in measured 
productivity compared to the non-liberalised foreign investment sectors. Re­
sults for the Levinsohn-Petrin method are stronger than those for ordinary 
least squares.
Coefficients for Industrial delicensing and tariff barriers are not signifi­
cantly different from zero indicating that they have been per se productivity 
neutral over this period.
A large part of industrial delicensing in India was undertaken in the mid 
1980’s (i.e. before the database starts in year 1989). The productivity effect 
of remaining industrial delicensing (at the firm level) does not seem to be 
significant in this database.
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Also compare with the existing hterature on trade liberalisation and pro­
ductivity. The results in literature have been varied over this issue; for ex­
ample, while Topalova (2004) found a negative and significant coefficient on 
tariff barriers indicating a positive productivity growth effect, Balakrishnan 
et al (2000) found trade liberahsation has no significant effect on total factor 
productivity of Indian manufacturing firms.
The explanation for this is straightforward. It is established in theory 
tha t changes in measured productivity are a sum of changes in mark-ups and 
pure technological progress (spillovers). The structural economic reforms un­
dertaken in India in the early 1990’s included industrial delicensing, trade 
reforms and foreign investment liberalisation as its three main pillars. While 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign technology agreements (FTA) are 
directly related to  technology, industrial deficensing and tariff barriers are per 
se not. Moreover, in the Indian case, foreign direct investment and foreign 
technology agreements go hand in hand. Here, when all major elements of 
the structural reform process are included in the specification, foreign invest­
ment liberalisation shows a significantly positive productivity growth effect, 
industrial delicensing and tariff liberalisation remain productivity neutral. 
While, no doubt the overall effect of Indian hberalisation on measured pro­
ductivity is positive, earlier researchers while trying to tease out the effect of 
tariff liberalisation from the overall impact of economic liberalisation, did not 
account for all (major) elements of structural reform, thereby committing an 
omitted variable bias.
To further ensure reliability of these results, I run a simple correlation ex­
periment between the three policy variables. I find tha t correlations between 
them are weak (correlation coefficient is 0.279 between foreign investment 
and industrial delicensing variable; -0.438 between tariff barriers and foreign 
investment policy variable; and -0.326 between tariff barriers and industrial 
delicensing variable). Thus, we can be reasonably confident of policy vari­
ables being separately identified in this model.
Age shows a typical non-linear relationship with productivity. The squared 
age corrects for it and demonstrates a small, but significantly positive pro­
ductivity growth effect.
4.4 .3  E ndogeneity o f  Policy Reform s
The Indian liberalisation of the 1990’s was a centrally executed technocratic 
reform triggered by largely unexpected shocks, namely, the sudden rise to
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power of the Narasimha Rao-Manmohan Singh combine, the macro-economic 
crisis facing the country at that time and the adoption of the IMF structural 
adjustment programme. At least the 1991-92 wave of liberalisation, which 
constituted the bulk of structural reform, was too rapid to afford any rea­
sonable opportunity for lobby formation. Therefore, the concern that firms 
may have acted in anticipation of these reforms or lobbied to influence the 
pattern of reforms seems to be of limited importance.
A potentially more serious issue is the possible selection of industries for 
liberalisation of foreign investment and industrial licensing. This concern 
would be adequately addressed, if it were possible to identify valid instru­
ments, namely, variables that are correlated with policy reforms, but not 
directly with firms’ measured productivity. Since this did not appear fea­
sible, I conducted a few experiments a la Aghion, Burgess, Redding and 
Zilibotti (2006), which suggest that endogeneity is at least not a first order 
issue (see Table 4.5).
In particular, I ran cross-section regressions (column 1 and 2) of the year 
in which an industry is liberalised for foreign investment or delicensed under 
the Industrial Development and Regulation Act on productivity growth dur­
ing the period 1989-91 (i.e. prior to such liberalisation). I find no evidence 
of any relationship between pre-reform productivity growth and when an in­
dustry is dehcensed or liberalised for foreign investment. In column 3 of the 
table, I run a similar experiment for trade liberalisation by regressing per­
centage point reduction in import tariffs between 1992-2004 on productivity 
growth during the period 1989-91 and again find no association between pre­
reform productivity growth and the size of future reductions in tariff. Thus, 
none of these experiments detects any evidence of systematic differences in 
productivity across industries that are correlated with future foreign invest­
ment, industrial licensing or trade liberalisation. Earlier researchers have 
held similar views about the Indian economic liberalisation of the 1990’s 
(Topalova, 2004; Krishna and Mitra, 1998; Balakrishnan et al, 2000 among 
others).
As an additional robustness check, I estimate a difference-in-differences 
model for the productivity effect of foreign investment liberalisation. Total 
period (1989-2004) is divided into three parts: pre-liberalisation (1989-91), 
period of liberalisation reforms (1992-98) and post-liberalisation (1999-04). 
This is because foreign investment liberalisation and industrial delicensing for 
the manufacturing sector was undertaken between the period 1992 to  1998. 
Although number of firms in the database fluctuate from year to year (see
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table 4.1 for details), approximately 1300 firms in the database span the three 
time periods together. These firms belong not only to the industries which 
were subject to foreign investment lineralisation, but also to industries which 
were not subject to this change. The specification estimated is as follows:
P i^ fo r i  +  ^2^dell +  (141)
where is the difference (change) in a firm’s average productivity be­
tween the post-liberalisation and the pre-liberalisation periods, A  fo r i  is the 
change in foreign investment policy status between the post-liberalisation 
and the pre-liberalisation periods, while A t a r i f f i  is the change in average 
tariff barrier between the post-liberalisation and the pre-liberalisation peri­
ods. Pq is the time related change common to  all firms, while are
the coefficients of the respective policy change variables mentioned above. 
The results are given in table 4.6. The results are similar to the fixed effects 
model, though quantitatively different. The foreign investment policy now 
has a 17 percent positive productivity growth effect on firms subject to  for­
eign investment liberalisation, while industrial delicensing and tariff barriers 
do not have a significant productivity growth effect as before.
4.5  A n  exam p le  o f  M otor V eh icle  In d u stry
Motor vehicle industry is a typical FDI intensive industry. It is also called 
the ‘industry of industries’,^  ^ and has been the focus of policy-makers the 
world over.
It has already been shown, that in the policy variable, it is not possible to 
distinguish between foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign technology 
agreements (FTA) as they were liberalised together as part of a conscious 
strategy. Here, I study the case of motor vehicle industry, and using alternate 
strategy, try to distinguish between FDI and FTA.
Since policy changes apply uniformly to all firms within the motor indus­
try, I use one stage estimation procedure a la Aitken and Harrison (1999). 
This estimation equation is:
Vit — f^ifor _eq-\- (142)
Motor car industry has also been the source of many path breaking revolutions like 
the assembly line and just-in-time techniques.
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where y denotes output (sales), k denotes capital, m  denotes materials, I 
denotes labour, e denotes power & fuel for firm i in year t. All these variables 
are expressed as log real values of expenditure, f t a  is a firm level indicator 
for whether a firm participates in a foreign technology agreement, which is 1 
from the year onwards in which foreign technology agreement/ collaboration 
is undertaken, and 0 otherwise, fo r  eq is the foreign promoter’s equity share 
in a firm, which is a time varying, firm level measure of foreign investment 
activity, r* represents year dummies, which control for time variant macro 
shocks, fi are the firm fixed effects, which control for time invariant het­
erogeneity or firm characteristics tha t could possibly determine, which firms 
undertake technology agreements/ collaborations abroad. The inclusion of 
firm fixed effects implies that coefficients and /?2 capture the relationship 
between changes in productivity and changes in foreign ownership or foreign 
technology agreement status. All direct foreign investments in the motor 
vehicle industry during this period were greenfield ventures.
The promoters equity details were compiled from the stock exchange data 
as well as from the respective company reports. Details of foreign technology 
agreement were compiled from actual approval records of the Department 
of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Government of India. All firms in the 
motor vehicle industry were subject to the same foreign investment policy, 
same industrial licensing policy and same trade policy reforms.
Since inputs are included as regressors on the right hand side, the sign 
and magnitude of coefficients ^^and /?2 capture the correlation between pro­
ductivity and foreign direct investment and foreign technology agreements 
respectively. The standard errors were clustered by firms and corrected for 
heteroskedasticity (see Table 4.6). FDI (foreign promoters equity) was found 
to be statistically significantly correlated with productivity in both the speci­
fications. FTA (Foreign Technology Agreement) was found to be statistically 
significantly correlated with productivity in at least one specification.
I then re-run these regressions after including an interaction term:
^ 3  i f or_eq  * f t a)  (143)
This interacts foreign promoters’ equity with the foreign technology agree­
ment (FTA) dummy. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
significant, suggesting a greater increase in productivity for domestically op­
erating foreign firms that participate in the foreign technology agreements.
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It appears the policy of simultaneously liberalising foreign technology agree­
ments and foreign direct investment is complementary as far as firms’ perfor­
mance and measured productivity in the motor vehicle industry is concerned.
4 .6  Sum m ary
This paper provides an analysis of the relationship between foreign invest­
ment pohcy and the performance of Indian manufacturing firms against the 
backdrop of structural reforms undertaken by Government of India during the 
1990’s. I use a hrm-year panel from the ‘Prowess’ database, which is a pub­
licly available database of large and medium sized firms in India. W ith the 
help of recently developed techniques of estimating production functions, to­
ta l factor productivity is computed firm and year wise. This method, called 
the Levinsohn-Petrin technique, uses intermediate inputs to  correct for si­
multaneity in firm’s production function. These results are compared with 
estimates obtained from ordinary least squares (OLS). I find both the meth­
ods give similar estimates for labour and materials coefficients; but capital 
coefficients and returns to  scale estimates obtained using OLS are lower than 
similar estimates obtained using the Levinsohn-Petrin technique.
While in the first stage of this study, multi-factor productivity was com­
puted separately for firms within each industry; in the second stage, it was 
made comparable across industries by computing a productivity index and 
relating changes in multi-factor productivity to various elements of policy 
reforms undertaken by Government of India over the same period. Foreign 
investment liberalisation was found to have a significant and positive effect on 
the performance of Indian manufacturing firms, with the foreign investment 
liberalised industries experiencing between seven to sixteen percent larger 
growth in multi-factor productivity as compared to the non foreign invest­
ment liberalised industries. The productivity effect of industrial delicensing 
and trade hberalisation was not found to be significantly different from zero 
over this period.
Foreign investment policy, as practised in India during this period, in­
cluded two essential components - permitting majority foreign equity in direct 
investments and automatic approval of foreign technology agreements. An 
alternative policy has been the so called ‘incentive competition’, whereby na­
tional governments offer liberal subsidies to potential multinational entrants 
for bringing in foreign direct investment into their respective countries. The
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la tter has been widely practised in South-East and East Asia. Indian policy 
makers seem to have resisted this temptation, at least till very recently, and 
instead pursued a combined policy of opening up to foreign direct invest­
ment, while at the same time encouraging adoption of foreign technology by 
domestic firms. An analysis of motor vehicle industry shows both elements 
of the foreign investment regime are in fact complementary to each other.
Another popular comparison is often made between India and China. 
While it is true that China, during this period, attracted greater FDI in­
flows, India over the same period, attracted greater portfolio investments 
and the ratio of market capitalisation of fisted firms to its GDP has been 
higher. Last year, Indian firms invested so much abroad tha t FDI outflow 
matched the FDI inflow. Indian foreign investment liberalisation is a par­
adigm that treats foreign technology and direct investment as inseparable 
from each other and such a policy is bound to have implications beyond 
the mere mention of FDI inflow figures. At least one important implication 
of this paradigm, namely, its positive effect on measured productivity and 
performance of manufacturing firms is elucidated by this study.
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4 .7  A p p en d ix  C
4.7.1 C l : E stim ating the Production  Function
Levinsohn-Petrin Method:
The following is a step-wise approach to estimating production functions 
using intermediate inputs to control for unobservables:
Take the logarithmic expression of a Cobb-Douglas technology from sec­
tion 4:
lÂ t =  +  ^ e ^ i t  +  +  4
where the variables are as defined earlier.
Stage 1:
1. Run a regression of on and to obtain an estimate of the
function E  using locally weighted least squares.
2. Run a regression of on and to obtain an estimate of the
function F  4 ) -
3. Run a regression of 4  on and 4  to obtain an estimate of the
function £■ ( 4 4 ) •
4. Construct Y  ( 4 , 4 )  ~  À ~  ^  ( 4 1 4 , 4 )  using the estimate of con­
ditional expectation from regression in step 1. This will be the dependent 
variable for step 5.
Similarly, difference out the predicted mean for other explanatory variable 
to get a new set of regressors tha t are net of materials and capital variation, 
tha t is
(yuL 4 )  and Xe (ml^ , 4 )  .
5. Run a no-intercept OLS regression of constructed dependent variable 
y  on a vector of constructed independent variables Xi and Xg.
This completes the first stage. The key estimated parameters from this 
stage are the production function parameters on all variable inputs except 
the input proxy, that is 
A and
Stage 2:
1. Compute the estimate of 4  4 )  >^y using the estimated parame­
ters from stepl. Save the estimate (fp■^ ()
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2. Choose a candidate value for , say . A good starting
value could be the OLS estimates of Cobb-Douglas production function.
3. Compute +  4  =  2/Jf -  P ii ~  ~  ~  4 -  Call this
variable "A".
4. Compute -  (3*^ .7ni^  — (3] , . Call  this variable "B".
5. Regress "A", on "B" again using locally weighted least squares. Call 
the new variable of predicted values "C" which is an estimate of E  .
6- Compute ^ 4  +  4 )  by substituting "C" = E  from step 5 to
obtain
4 + 4  {Pmfik) = Vit ~ ^lit ~ ~  ^ iM t ~  /^e-4 “  ^  [ 4 M t- l ]
7. Finally, obtain estimates of remaining parameters of the production
function, that is by minimizing the GMM criteria function (i.e. dis­
tance between observed moments and zero). This entails repeated iterations 
over the previous six steps. Default iteration is 50.
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4.7 .2  C2 : E stim ating the Production  Function (Treatm ent o f  
Variables)
Prowess is a database of large and medium sized, primarily listed, Indian 
firms compiled by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, Mumbai (Bom­
bay) starting in the year 1989. This firm level data is compiled from the 
balance sheet and income-expenditure statements of firms submitted to the 
statutory authorities. The variables used for estimating the production func­
tion are: value of output (sales), gross fixed assets (capital), salaries and 
wages (labour), expenditure on materials, and power and fuel expenses.
Following Topalova (2004) the value of output (sales), and power and 
fuels were converted into real terms using the industry specific wholesale 
price indices; expenses on materials using the manufacturing wholesale price 
index; while salaries and wages were deflated using the wholesale price index 
(unskilled and semi-skilled wages in the organised sector in India are linked, 
by law, to  the wholesale price index).
Labour inputs have been used in different ways across studies depending 
upon the data availability. In balance sheet data  like the Prowess, the salaries 
and wages are reported not only more reliably, but also more regularly than 
the labour employment figures.^^ For studies like this one, where produc­
tivity is not used in the absolute sense, but only in a relative sense through 
the industry normalised productivity index, it does not make much differ­
ence to the final outcome. This is because the difference between estimating 
production function using salaries and wages, and estimating it using the 
employment figures is, that in the latter, log of wages, which is subsumed 
in the absolute multifactor productivity term, gets subtracted out during 
computation of the relative productivity measure.
The task of measuring capital employed by the firm in its production 
process is more difficult. The balance sheet data reports firm’s capital in 
terms of its book value, which is based on a historical cost rather than its 
true replacement value. The task of converting it to its replacement value 
involves computing a revaluation factor as explained below:
Gross fixed assets (GFA) at historic cost is defined as
GFA  ^ =  Pth +  Pt-ilt-i +  Pt-2h-2 + ......
where Pt is price of capital. It denotes investment and t the time-period.
Contrast this with the census type data of manufacturing firms, where employment 
figures are both reliable and reported regularly.
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Define g — I t/h - i  as the constant growth rate of investment and tt =  Pt/Pt-i 
as the constant rate at which price of capital changes. Using geometric series 
the above expression can be simplified as
G F 4  =  P J, + ? l h  + ^ J - l + .......=
Gross fixed assets (GFA) at replacement cost is defined as 
GF = Ptit +  P th-i +  Pth-2 + .....
which again using geometric series can be simplified as
GFA^, =  PJt + P t -  + P t ^  + ....... =
9 r  9
The revaluation factor is defined as the ratio of the value of asset at
replacement cost to the value of asset at historic cost:
dG _  G F  A l _  (1 +  ^) (1 +  tt) -  1 
GFA'l g ( l  +  7T)
If we assume the capital stock has a finite economic life of r  years, the 
equivalent expression obtained from the literature (Balakrishnan et al, 2000) 
is:
j^ G _  [(1 + - 1] (1 + [(1 +  g) (1 +  7t) - 1]
5 ([( l +  p ) ( l  +  7r)]^ '^  ^ -  1)
The life of capital is taken as twenty years (r  =  20), which is the bench­
mark life span for the machinery. Parameters g and tt are obtained from 
a series on gross capital formation available on the Reserve Bank of India 
web site. This information is used to compute the revaluation factor using 
the above formula. Because of the parameter r  in the formula, the revalu­
ation factor for every firm in its base year (the first year a firm appears in 
the database) depends on the age of the firm, which is the base year minus 
the year of incorporation. Once a firm’s capital is revalued in its base year, 
subsequent year’s revalued capital is obtained using the actual year by year 
growth rate of gross fixed assets for that firm in the data. The capital reval­
ued at replacement cost is finally deflated using the wholesale price index for 
machinery and machine tools.
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4.7 .3  C3 : A  N ote  on 'IVade Barriers
Tariff rates are compiled from the Custom Tariff of India Manuals published 
by and on behalf of the Central Board of Excise and Customs, Department of 
Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Although many studies 
in the past have used the basic rate of custom duty, this underestimates the 
height of tariff barriers. I use applied tariff as a measure of tariff barriers. 
This is computed from a combination of basic, auxiliary and countervailing 
duties according to  the formula given below:
Applied T a r i f f  =  Basic + Auxiliary
(100 +  basic +  auxiliary) * countervailing duty
+ - 100
D ata were collected for the rates of duty for the years 1988,1992, 1997 and 
2003 at the level of six digit product classification of the harmonized System 
(HS). I develop an improved electronic version of the mapping between HS 
product classification system and the National Classification of India (NIC87) 
by working on an article by Debroy and Santhanam in the Foreign Trade 
Bulletin, India, 1993. As a second step, I map NIC87 classification to the 
NIC98 classification using a correspondence table supplied by the Central 
Statistical Organisation, India. The applied tariffs are computed at the level 
of 4-digit NIC98 industries as an arithmetic average of applied tariffs for 
all the products mapped to the respective 4-digit industry. Since all policy 
variables are applied with a lag, applied tariffs for 1988 are applied to  year 
1989, applied tariffs for year 2003 to year 2004 and all tariffs in between are 
calculated by linear interpolation.
In 1991 India introduced a policy of treating all products not mentioned 
on prohibited, canalised and restricted lists as being on the open general list 
by default. The subsequent changes in the product items mentioned on the 
restricted list (about 300 hs items) have been narrower than 4-digit industry 
sectors. The Export-Import Policy of 1988-1991 was itself a result of some 
liberalisation since mid 1980’s and therefore procedurally quite close to the 
Export-Import Policy of 1992-97. The prohibited and canalised items were 
the same in 1988-1991 as they were in 1992-97 or subsequently. In addition 
to prohibited and canalised items, materials and capital goods in the period 
1988-91 were divided between restricted, limited permissible and open general 
lists. The difference between limited permissible and open general lists was
116
only a difference in procedures. Even in open general list, license were subject 
to satisfying some conditions and in both, export oriented units were allowed 
to import freely subject to tariff barriers. There is no simple or even agreed 
way of calculating to what extent these procedures increase the height of tariff 
barriers. Subject to this approximation, I use applied tariffs as a measure of 
trade barriers over the period 1989 to 2004.
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Figure 4.1: Trends in Foreign Investm ent In India (1990-2005) 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investm ent 
FPI: Foreign Portfolio Investm ent
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Figure 4.2: P roductiv ity  Index for Indian M anufacturing Industries re­
lated to  tim ing of elections, T F P  estim ated by OLS.
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Figure 4.3: P roductiv ity  Index for Indian M anufacturing Industries re­
lated to  tim ing of elections. T F P  estim ated by Levinsohn-Petrin M ethod.
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Table 4.1 : Distribution of Firms by Year and Ownership
Central State Private Private C0“ Joint
Year Govt. Govt. (Indian) (Foreign) operative Sector Total
1989 70 12 873 124 2 9 1,090
1990 72 14 972 135 2 8 1,203
1991 73 14 957 104 2 8 1,158
1992 82 13 1,509 189 2 10 1,805
1993 83 15 1,845 203 2 12 2,160
1994 86 18 2,428 215 2 16 2,765
1995 87 22 2,943 231 2 17 3,302
1996 87 26 3,067 233 2 16 3,431
1997 87 23 3,026 241 2 18 3,397
1998 86 16 3,027 247 2 19 3,397
1999 79 25 3,210 256 2 18 3,590
2000 80 28 3,342 273 2 18 3,743
2001 79 31 3,284 261 2 17 3,674
2002 81 28 3,349 253 2 17 3,730
2003 90 40 3,424 244 2 16 3,816
2004 90 40 3,226 235 2 15 3,608
Total 1,312 365 40,482 3,444 32 234 45,869
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Table 4.2: Comparing Estimates of Production Functions by 
Ordinary Least Squares (ols) and Levinsohn-Petrin (levpet) Methods
Capital Coefficient Labour Coefficient
ols levpet ols levpet
Mean 0.079 0.148 0.245 0.246
Std. Dev. 0.074 0.143 0.140 0.144
Minimum -0.367 0.01 -0.10195 -0.096
Maximum 0.345 0.98 0.978 0.870
Correlation 0.18 0.18 0.97 0.97
Observations 45491 45503 45491 45503
Materials Coefficient Returns to Scale
ols levpet ols levpet
Mean 0.606 0.604 1.001 1.211
Std. Dev. 0.122 0.124 0.049 0.274
Minimum 0.236 0.262 0.743 0.836
Maximum 1.275 1.316 1.273 2.951
Correlation 0.97 0.97 0.16 0.16
Observations 45491 45503 45491 45503
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Table 4.3: Hausman Specification Tests 
Fixed vs Random Effects Model
(1) Regressions with TFP Estimated by Ordinary Least Squares:
Coefficients
(b)
Fixed
(B)
Random
(b-B)
Difference
Sqrt (diag(V_b- 
V_B)) S.E.
Fdi_variable 0.0318776 0.0287861 0.0030915 0.0027956
Tariff_barrier 0.0000688 0.0001367 0.0030915 0.0001046
Delicensing 0.0024834 -0.002582 0.0050654 0.0033063
Age 0.0017397 -0.0010088 0.0027486 0.0017546
Age-square 0.0003685 6.32e-06 0.0003622 0.0000925
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(19) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_Br(-l)](b-B) = 87.99 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
(2) Regressions with TFP Estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin Method:
Coefficients
(b)
Fixed
(B)
Random
(b-B)
Difference
Sqrt (diag(V_b- 
V_B)) S.E.
Fdi_variable 0.0630923 0.0464668 0.0166255 0.002079
Tariff_barrier 0.0007377 0.000546 0.0001917 0.0000837
Delicensing 0.0432538 0.0348677 0.0083861 0.0025067
Age -0.0096166 -0.0048547 -0.0047618 0.0019624
Age-square 0.0012681 0.0000254 0.0012427 0.0001057
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; ol 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficier
Dtained from xtreg
it under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(18) = (b-B)’[(V_b-V_Br(-l)](b-B) = 85.22 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table 4.4: Effects of Foreign Investment Policy on Manufacturing Sector Productivity in India 
Firm Year Panel (1989-2004), Fixed Effects Model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Productivity Index Productivity Index Productivity Index Productivity Index
(levpet) (levpet) (ols) (ols)
Foreign_lnvestment_Policy 0.0696(0.0276)** 0.0696(0.0301)** 0.0325(0.0182)* 0.0325(0.0188)*
Industrial Delicensing 0.0294(0.0338) 0.0294(0.0329) -0.0013(0.0188) -0.0013 (0.0193)
Tariff Barriers 0.0010(0.0007) 0.0010(0.0007) -0.0002(0.0007) -0.0002(0.0006)
Age -0.0076(0.0071) -0.0076(0.0063) 0.0008(0.0037) 0.0008 (0.0026)
Age-square 0.0013(0.0004)*** 0.0013(0.0004)*** 0.0004(0.0002)** 0.0004(0.0002)*
Ownership dropped dropped dropped dropped
Firm size dropped dropped dropped dropped
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Robust and Bootstrapped and Robust and Bootstrapped and
Clustered(by industry) Clustered (by industry) Clustered(by industry) Clustered (by industry)
TFP estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin Method Levinsohn-Petrin Method Ordinary Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
Rho 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
R-squared (within) 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
No of Observations 34393 34393 38035 38035
Coefficients with standard errors in brackets. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at 1,5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
124
Table 4.5: Selection o f Industries for Policy Liberalisation.
Dependent Variable (1)
Year of Foreign 
Investment Liberalisation
(2)
Year of Industrial 
Delicensing Reform
(3)
Tariff Reduction 
1992-2004
Productivity Growth 1989-91 -0.020 -0.096 -0.006
(0.110) (0.117) (0.006)
Standard Errors Robust Robust Robust
Observations 70 31 81
R-squared 0.0002 0.008 0.011
Correlation Coefficient -0.014 -0.091 -0.108
Columns 1 and 2 are based on cross-section regressions of the first year in which an industry is foreign investment liberalised or de-licensed 
under the Industrial Development and Regulation Act on productivity growth over the period 1989-91. Industries which were never de-licensed 
or liberalised for foreign investment are excluded from the regressions. The productivity here is Total Factor Productivity as estimated by 
Levinsohn-Petrin Method. Column 3 is a cross-section regression of percentage point reduction in tariffs on productivity growth over the period 
1989-91. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1,5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 4.6: Productivity Effects of Foreign Investment Liberalisation 
(Difference-in-Differences Approach).
Dependent Variable (1) Productivity (2) Productivity (3) Productivity (4) Productivity
Growth Growth Growth Growth
(levpet) (levpet) (levpet) (levpet)
Foreign_lnvestment_Policy 0.158(0.065)** 0.155(0.068)** 0.155(0.093)* 0.155(0.080)*
Industrial Delicensing -0.005(0.032) -0.005(0.028) -0.005(0.061) -0.005(0.050)
Change in Tariff Barriers 0.0009(0.0006) 0.0009(0.0005) 0.0009(0.0009) 0.0009(0.0010)
Standard Errors Robust and Bootstrapped and Robust and Bootstrapped and
Clustered (by firm) Clustered (by firm) Clustered (by industry) Clustered (by industry)
TFP Estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin Levinsohn-Petrin Levinsohn-Petrin Levinsohn-Petrin
Method Method Method Method
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
No of Observations 1293 1293 1293 1293
(l)Productivity Growth is the difference between average firm's productivity before liberalisation (1989-1991) and the average 
firm's productivity after liberalisation (1999-2004). (2) Foreign Investment Policy and Industrial Delicensing variables are 1 for 
firms in the industries that underwent foreign investment liberalisation or industrial delicensing between 1992-1998. (3) Change in 
Tariff Barriers is the difference in the average tariff before liberalisation (1989-1991) and the average tariff after liberalisation 
(1989-1991). (4) Coefficients with standard errors in brackets. (5) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively.
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Table 4.7: Foreign Direct Investment vs Foreign Technology Agreement 
(A Case Study of Motor Vehicle Industry).
Dependent Variable Log_sales Log_sales Log_sales Log_sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign Equity (fdi) 0.006(0.002)*** 0.014(0.007)* -0.005(0.002)** -0.006(0.009)
Foreign Tech. Ag.(fta) 0.142(0.050)*** -0.468(0.392) -0.843(0.284)*** -0.468(0.308)
Fdi * Fta 0.008(0.003)** 0.593(0.193)***
log_capital -0.0009(0.040) -0.009(0.047) -0.0009(0.040) -0.0009(0.047)
log_labour 0.139(0.059)** 0.139(0.059)** 0.139(0.059)** 0.139(0.048)***
log_materials 0.941(0.042)*** 0.941(0.043)*** 0.941(0.042)*** 0.941(0.041)***
log_energy 0.041(0.043) 0.041(0.049) 0.041(0.044) 0.041(0.052)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Robust and Bootstrapped and Robust and Bootstrapped and
Clustered(by firm) Clustered (by firm) Clustered(by firm) Clustered (by firm)
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
No of Observations 325 325 325 325
Coefficients with standard errors in brackets.
***,** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 4.8: (I) SECTORS ATTRACTING HIGH FDI INFLOWS:
Amount Rupees in crore (US $ in milUon)
Rank Sector Amount of FDI Inflows % age of
2002-03
(April-
March)
2003-04
(April-
March)
2004-05
(April-
Jan.)
Cumulative
Total (from 
August 1991 
to January 
2005)
total FDI 
Inflows 
(in rupee 
terms)
1. Electrical Equipments 3,075 2,449 2,988 16,918 15.37
(including computer software & 
electronics)
(644) (532) (655) (3,977) (15.15)
2 . Transportation industry 2,173 1,417 925 12,442 11.30
(455) (308) (203) (2,980) (11.35)
3 . Telecommunications 1,058 532 703 11,428 10.38
(radio paging, cellular mobile, basic 
telephone services)
(223) (116) (155) (2,718) (10.35)
4 . 551 521 730 10,532 9.57
Fuels (Power + Oil Refinery) (118) (113) (160) (2,481) (9.45)
5 . Services Sector 1,551 1,235 1.192 9,326 8.47
(financial & non-financial) (326) (269) (261) (2,300) (8.76)
6 . Chemicals 611 94 962 6,654 6.05
(other than fertilizers) (129) (20) (210) (1.708) (6.51)
7 . Food Processing industries 177 511 195 4,540 4.12
(37) (111) (43) (1,142) (4.35)
8 . Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 192 502 1,347 3,556 3.23
(40) (109) (293) (836) (3.18)
9. Metallurgical Industries 222
(47)
146
(32)
901
(197)
2,155
(506)
1.96
(1.93)
10. Consultancy Services 122
(26)
257
(56)
1,159
(252)
1,884
(411)
1.71
(1.57)
(II) SECTORS-WISE FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER APPROVALS:
Rank Sector No. o f Technical 
Collaborations approved
% age o f 
total
1. Electrical Equipments
(Including computer software & electronics)
1,245 16.24
2. Chemicals (other than fertilizer) 863 11.26
3. Industrial Machinery 859 11.21
4. Transportation Industry 689 8.99
5. Metallurgical Industry 365 4.76
6. Other sectors 3,643 47.54
Total of all Sectors 7,664 100.00
Source: Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, 
Government of India.
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5  C onclusions
In this thesis, I theoretically and empirically investigated how FDI Policy 
affects certain aspects of firm behaviour. The insights offered by its three 
main chapters are as follows:
In the second ch ap te r, I developed a general equilibrium model of multi­
national firms operating under monopolistic competition and foreign invest­
ment uncertainty. Starting from a pure trading equilibrium and solving for 
the optimal foreign investment rule gave a scale-up factor, which implied ex­
istence of a wedge between markup revenues and foreign investment costs. 
Greater volatility and risk aversion increased this scale-up over foreign in­
vestment costs implying a delay in the exercise of FDI option, while growing 
market size (national income) facilitated early exercise. The model was ex­
tended to a mixed Poisson jump-Brownian motion process, which modelled 
policy driven FDI reforms. It showed how a sudden drop in foreign invest­
ment costs brought about by a policy shift, as also a greater probability of 
it, could facilitate early exercise of the FDI option. This model implied ‘hys­
teresis’, which explained ‘wait and watch’ behaviour of multinational firms 
better than a pure comparative advantage-trade cost framework does. While 
investment under uncertainty literature is based on the theory of call options, 
I solved ‘FDI option’ as a put option, thereby also enriching the theory of 
real options.
In the th ird  ch ap te r, I developed a model of long run industry equilib­
rium with firm heterogeneity and market power. Mark-ups in this model were 
endogenous and responsive to toughness of market competition. It brought 
out potential gains in market power and profits as an additional reason for 
undertaking FDI in addition to reasons already enshrined in the literature 
as proximity-concentration trade-off. The model was used to  analyse the 
interaction between profit maximizing behaviour of multinational firms and 
the welfare maximizing objective of the central planner (national govern­
ment). In this framework, FDI was not found to be an unambiguously wel­
fare improving proposition. While multinational firms gained profits, host 
and home countries could gain or lose welfare depending on how returns 
from foreign investment are distributed amongst the residents of the home 
and the host economies. This model brought out the importance of multilat­
eral investment regime and bilateral investment treaties in refining multiple 
Nash equilibria to ensure the most liberal FDI policy regime is implemented 
worldwide.
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In the fo u rth  ch ap te r, I carried out an empirical investigation into the 
relationship between foreign investment policy and manufacturing firms’ per­
formance as estimated by multi-factor productivity against the backdrop of 
Indian liberalisation of the 1990’s. Using a hrm-year panel from 1989 to  2004, 
I obtained consistent estimates of firm’s production functions, and controlling 
for industrial delicensing and trade reforms, estimated the effects of foreign 
investment liberalisation on measured productivity of manufacturing firms. 
Foreign investment liberalisation was found to have significantly improved 
the performance of Indian manufacturing firms. A particularly interesting 
feature of India’s foreign investment policy over this period has been encour­
aging adoption of foreign technology by domestic firms, while at the same 
time opening up these industry sectors to  foreign direct investment. The 
joint effect of foreign investment and technology liberalisation was estimated 
as between seven to seventeen percent increase in measured productivity of 
manufacturing firms over this period. A case study of the motor vehicle 
industry showed these two elements of the foreign investment regime have 
actually been complementary to each other.
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